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THE STANDARD OF CARE IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE: DO 
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
DERNE IT? 
Gary A. Munneke' 
Anthony E. Davis, Esq." 
The standard of care for legal malpractice is normally established by 
expert testimony as to the customary practice of lawyers in the jurisdic- 
tion. In recent years, an increasing number of courts have permitted evi- 
dence that an attorney has violated an ethical rule of professional conduct 
to show a breach of the professional standard of care. Although this prac- 
tice is by no means universally accepted, the implications of this trend 
are noteworthy. 
The plaintiff suing an attorney can utilize a fixed standard of con- 
duct and avoid the somewhat fuzzy problem of identifying when deviance 
from customary practice constitutes professional failure. Whether stated 
explicitly or not, the inference is that a reasonably prudent lawyer would 
not violate an ethical rule defining appropriate professional behavior. By 
falling below the minimal level of conduct mandated by the ethics code, 
an attorney breaches the professional standard of care owed to clients, 
and therefore may be held legally responsible for harm caused by the 
breach. 
The idea that courts can look to statutory enactments, administrative 
regulations, or other codes to find standards of conduct is well established 
in tort law. Consider the case of an individual who has been hit by a car. 
In a suit against the driver of the car, the attorney for the plaintiff may 
prove that the defendant's car was traveling at 55 m.p.h. when the acci- 
dent occurred and that the speed limit at the accident site was only 25 
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m.p.h. The fact that the driver was exceeding the legal speed limit would 
constitute negligence per se.' Yet some states and commentators fail to 
recognize the applicability of this analogy in legal malpractice cases, and 
expressly decline to permit jurors to know when the defendant lawyer's 
conduct violated a state rule of professional conduct. This article con- 
cludes that such a position is wrong.2 
The outcome of this debate affects not only the mechanics of prov- 
ing allegations of malpractice, but also the standards by which lawyers 
should be adjudged, both individually and collectively.' The issue is 
whether, to what extent, and in what manner state disciplinary rules4 
should be relevant in civil claims or allegations of legal malpractice. 
As a practical matter, admission of expert testimony that an attorney 
has violated an ethical rule is likely to be highly persuasive to a jury 
considering whether an attorney has committed malpractice. Conversely, 
expert opinion that an attorney has abided by the rules of professional 
conduct may help to vindicate an attorney defendant. One of the reasons 
some commentators object to the admission of such testimony is that they 
fear that it may be prejudicial to attorney defendants,' although the rule 
can cut both ways. 
The need to address the issue is made particularly pressing by recent 
decisions such as Hizey v. Carpenter, in which the Supreme Court of 
1. Although the weight attached to the violation of a statute may vary, there is 
little dispute that courts can and do utilize statutes to establish standards of conduct. 
See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc., (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S. Ct. 
242 (1979); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Bob Godfrey Pontiac, 
Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981). 
2. See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P. 2d 646 (Wash. 1992). Ronald E. 
Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith (4th ed. 1996) Legal Malpractice 8 18.7, at 576-585 
[hereinafter Mallen & Smith]. 
3. The issue is of fundamental importance to every lawyer practicing in the 
United States, individually or in a firm, as well as to the profession as a whole. It 
goes to the heart of the current debate over the esteem-or lack thereof-with which 
lawyers are held in the eyes of the public. 
4. Including those based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(1983) [hereinafter Model Rules], the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibili- 
ty (1969) [hereinafter Model Code], or a system created independently from the 
ABA, see, e.g., Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct. Collectively, these rules are re- 
ferred to throughout this Article as disciplinary or ethical rules. 
5. See, e.g., ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Vol. 13. No. 
25 (Aug. 1997). reporting that San Francisco attorney and treatise author Ronald 
Mallen said "Once a lawyer is labeled 'unethical' it's as bad as being branded with 
a scarlet letter." 
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Washington refused to permit the use of ethical rules in establishing the 
standard of care in legal malpractice in that state.6 Because of the growth 
of interstate practice, it is becoming increasingly important for attorneys 
who practice across jurisdictional lines and for their malpractice carriers 
to have predictable rules defining the standard of professional care, and 
for such rules to be grounded in a common body of law.7 
A larger but related question is when, if ever, the rules of profes- 
sional conduct should carry weight outside the disciplinary system. As 
this article demonstrates, courts regularly cite ethical rules in cases in- 
volving a variety of legal questions outside the fields of legal malpractice 
and attorney discipline. Some of these situations represent alternative 
remedies for attorney misconduct. Some involve litigation issues that go 
far beyond claims for damages against the attorney. 
An example of an action where the result hinged upon the ethics 
code, but did not involve either allegations of malpractice or attorney 
discipline, is a 1992 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Maritrans Group, 
Inc. v. Pepper Hamilton &  sheet^.^ In 1987, Maritrans, a tugboat opera- 
tor in New York harbor and the Delaware River, learned that its regular 
law firm, Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, of Philadelphia, intended to repre- 
sent certain competitors of Maritrans in contract negotiations with labor 
 union^.^ When Maritrans objected to Pepper's representation of its com- 
petitors, Pepper withdrew from representing Maritrans and proceeded 
with the labor negotiations.1° In an unusual move, Maritrans sued Pepper 
to enjoin the representation of the economic competitors, and for darnag- 
es, claiming that the law firm's actions amounted to a conflict of inter- 
est." The Court of Common Pleas issued an injunction against the rep- 
6. Hizey, 830 P.2d at 648. 
7. The problem of common standards goes far beyond the scope of this article. 
and parallels the demise of the locality rule in medical malpractice; but generally, as 
society has moved from local, to state, to regional, to national orientation, profes- 
sional practices have come to be defined more by national standards than local ones. 
The standard in legal malpractice has always been a reasonably prudent lawyer in 
the jurisdiction, see infra note 206 and accompanying text, a standard often localized 
through expert testimony. Jurisdictional differences, however, are rapidly disappearing 
as to what constitutes ordinary prudent conduct. 
8. Maritrans Group, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 
1992). 
9. Id. at 1280. 
10. Id. at 1281. 
11. Id. (citing No. 238 Feb. T. 1988, Gafni, J. (Philadelphia County)). 
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resentation on the ground that Pepper's conduct represented a conflict of 
interest contrary to Rule 1.7 and 1.9 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Profes- 
sional Conduct." 
The Superior Court reversed, holding that violations of the ethical 
code could not provide an independent basis for a cause of action." On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, counsel for Maritrans ar- 
gued that "the Code and Rules . . . condemn violations of common law 
duties which have an independent exi~tence,"'~ in this case a breach of 
fiduciary duty.I5 The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's deci- 
sion staying the preliminary injunction order,16 but noted that Maritrans 
failed to "establish an independent cause of action encompassing the 
asserted duty."" The decision, however, left open the possibility that 
such an independent basis could be shown, and, significantly, did not 
reject Maritrans' contention that the ethical rules could embody civil 
 standard^.'^ 
The Pennsylvania courts' uneasiness with the issue of how to treat 
12. Id. at 1281-282 citing No. 238 Feb. T. 1988, Gafani, J. (Philadelphia Coun- 
ty). 
13. Maritrans Group Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 572 A.2d 737, 742-743 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
14. Maritrans G.P.. Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz. 573 A.2d 1001 (Pa. 
1990). 
15. Id. at 1003. 
16. Maritram. 602 A.2.d at 1288. 
17. Maritram, 573 A.2d at 1004. 
18. Maritram, 602 A.2d at 1284. 
The Superior Court correctly recognized that simply because a lawyer's 
conduct may violate the rules of ethics does not mean that the conduct 
is actionable, in damages or for injunctive relief. The court was also 
correct in saying that the trial court's finding of violation of the ethical 
rules concerning misuse of a client's confidences is not as such a basis 
for issuing an injunction. These propositions are correct under either the 
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Professional Con- 
duct. However, the Superior Court then stood this correct analysis on its 
head. That court held that the trial judge's reference to violations of the 
rules of ethics somehow negated or precluded the existence of a breach 
of legal duty by the Pepper firm to its former client. The court also 
held that the presumption of misuse of a former client's confidences, de- 
veloped in the law of disqualification, is inapplicable because the present 
case involves an injunction. Both of these propositions involve serious 
confusion in the law governing lawyers. Id. 
Heinonline - -  22 J. Legal Prof. 36 1998 
19981 Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice 37 
ethical violations illustrates how troublesome such cases can be. Because 
the decided cases in this area are both inconsistent and confusing, further 
analysis is needed in order to articulate appropriate standards for courts to 
apply in situations where a lawyer's ethical misconduct ostensibly harms 
the interests of their clients. 
This Article will review existing case law and commentary, and 
propose a new formula for application of rules of professional conduct in 
determining the standard of care to which attorneys should be held in 
malpractice cases. The authors will argue in favor of establishing a posi- 
tion that state rules of professional conduct create certain specific stan- 
dards of lawyer behavior that constitute a minimum standard of conduct 
and a minimum standard of care for every individual attorney practicing 
in each jurisdiction. 
Although there is room for debate as to how much weight should be 
given to evidence of ethics violations, there is little room for argument as 
to whether such evidence should be admissible. Furthermore, certain 
ethics rules clearly purport to create standards of conduct relating to 
lawyers' duties to their clients, while other rules do not. As such, it fol- 
lows that the question should not be whether the rules of professional 
conduct as a whole define the standard of care, but whether specific rules 
governing attorney conduct actually do so. The authors will show how 
this approach to analyzing the problem helps to synthesize some of the 
seemingly inconsistent cases. 
The key to determining whether a rule is susceptible to application 
in a civil action ought to be whether the specific rule was intended to 
protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the 
type of harm that eventuated.I9 Thus, it will be argued that courts should 
apply this test to determine whether a specific rule of conduct should 
establish the standard of care. 
This Article tackles the question of the proper role of the ethics 
codes in malpractice cases in the following sequence. Section 11 reviews 
the legal background of both ethical rules and literature on the question 
of applying ethical standards in legal malpractice cases, including a dis- 
cussion of the disclaimers contained in the model ethics codes: Section III 
discusses the role of the disciplinary system and demonstrates that the 
functions already served by the ethics codes clearly go beyond the con- 
text of discipline. Section IV examines the basic elements of the tort of 
19. See infra note 1 1 1  and accompanying text. 
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legal malpractice. Section V takes a look at the developing trend to admit 
evidence of ethical violations to prove a breach of the standard of care. 
Section VI analyzes these various systems and the decided cases from the 
perspective of custom and statutory violation, presenting four possible 
general rules of application, and attempts to synthesize the different posi- 
tions into a coherent approach to the problem. Section VII summarizes 
the authors' analysis, concluding that ethical violations are relevant and 
admissible as to the professional standard of care in legal malpractice. 
The leading article on ethical behavior and the standard of care in 
legal malpractice was written by Professor Charles Wolfram in 1979 
Professor Wolfram concluded: 
[Tlhe judicial response to opportunities for . . . enhanced enforce- 
ment of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] has been, frankly, 
too grudging. And the Code itself could be made much more explicit 
in defining and in some instances making more rigorous the responsi- 
bilities of the attorney in several areas that may result in civil litiga- 
tion. The potential use of more specific standards in civil litigation 
will doubtless create pressures against their adoption because of the 
narrow, pocketbook concerns of attorneys. 
Many commentators have agreed with Wolfram's approach and conclud- 
ed that violations of the code of legal ethics should be relevant to the 
standard of care in legal malpractice. There are, however, a number of 
writers on the subject who do not embrace Wolfram's ideas.m Although 
the tide is turning, many courts traditionally were unwilling to allow 
ethics code violations to intrude into the separate world of civil liability 
for malpractice." 
20. See, e.g., Robert Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil 
Damage Actions Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO L. REV. 1 (1982); Jean E. Raure and R. 
Keith Strong, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: No Standard For Malprac- 
tice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363 (1986); Laura K. Thomas. Professional Conduct-Lazy 
Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C.: The Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility as a Basis for Attorney Liability. 22 M u .  ST. U. LE. REV. 169 (1991). 
21. See, e.g., Terry Cove, Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C., 521 So. 2d 22, 24 
(Ala. 1988) ("[Aln alleged violation of a Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Profes- 
sional Responsibility cannot, independently. serve as a legal basis for a civil action 
for money damages."); Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171, 175 (Conn. 1987) 
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One factor that has had an impact on this question is the widespread 
discontent within the profession with the ethical rules themselves, unrelat- 
ed to issues of civil liability. Until 1969, lawyers in every state were 
governed by the Canons of Professional Ethics, an amorphous collection 
of standards, originally passed by the American Bar Association (ABA) 
in 1908.22 In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which was subsequently promulgated almost universally, 
although with certain variations, throughout the United States.23 
By 1983, dissatisfaction with the Code led to the passage of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Unlike the Code, the new Rules 
were not instantly accepted by the states, and many states modified the 
"model" rules in a variety of ways. By 1997, however, thirty-nine juris- 
dictions had adopted some form of the Model  rule^.^" 
Significantly, during the' period between 1983 and, the mid-1990s, 
("[V]iolations of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not give rise to any 
private cause of action for legal malpractice by anyone, including an attorney's cli- 
ent."); L & H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 380 (Minn. 1989) 
("A violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot give rise to a private ac- 
tion against an attorney. The Rules are intended to discipline attorneys, not provide a 
basis for civil liability."); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds. P.C., 813 
S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tenn. 1991) ("It is clear that the purpose of the Code is to state 
when a lawyer will be subject to disciplinary action and not to define standards 
whereby he may be held civilly liable for damages."). 
22. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). 
23. California has promulgated its own Code that, while similar to the Model 
Code, contains none of the ABA's Ethical Considerations. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 5 
X (West 1994); See also Wolfram, supra note 21. 
24. The thirty-nine states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut. Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota. Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ABAINBA Lawyeri' Manual 
on Professional Conduct 1:3-4 (1997). North Carolina, and Virginia have incorporated 
some of the substance of the Model Rules, while California follows neither the Mod- 
el Rules nor the Model Code. Id. Some states, like New York, purported to amend 
the Model Code to incorporate the substance of the Model Rules. See Gary L. 
Casella, Amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility, 17 WESTCHESTER 
BAR J. 261,. 268. These efforts produced a beast that was neither fish nor fowl. that 
retained many of the failings of the code, that ignored many of the improvements in 
the Rules, such as the format itself, and that confused more lawyers than it enlight- 
ened. 
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many states were vigorously debating adoption of the Model Rules, a 
process which did not proceed at the same pace in every jurisdiction. As 
a result, there was no clear national consensus regarding the ethical 
codes, and standards remained in a state of flux.= In jurisdictions that 
adopted the Rules, courts were forced to rely upon case law decided 
under the Code,26 and may have done so less critically than they should 
have. 
The starting point of the debate, as the framers of both the Code and 
Rules intended, should focus on the disclaimers of civil liability contained 
in their respective  preamble^.^' The last paragraph of the Preliminary 
Statement at the beginning of the Model Code, first adopted in 1969, 
states: 
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are man- 
datory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level 
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to 
disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplin- 
ary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of 
the nature of their professional activities. The Model Code makes no 
attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or the penalties for 
violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define 
standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. The 
severity of judgment against one found guilty of violating a Disci- 
plinary Rule should be determined by the character of the offense 
and the attendant circumstances. . . . [Footnotes omitted; emphasis 
added]. 
The inherent contradiction within this passage, exemplified by the 
25. Although any given jurisdiction applies one code or the other, and although 
the differences between the Code and Rules are not significant in many cases. the 
overall sense of uncertainty may have slowed the trend toward utilizing ethical stan- 
dards in malpractice cases. Cf: Gary A Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: New 
Perspectives on Law Finn Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 579 (1992). 
26. See Robert J. Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1016, 1018, n.9. 
27. "The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or 
penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define stan- 
dards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." Model Code, Prelimi- 
nary Statement; "Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor 
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are 
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating 
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability." Model Code, Preliminary Statement. 
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two italicized clauses, was carried forward with a vengeance into the 
Model Rules, when these were adopted in 1983. While the Model Rules 
omit the clear statement that they are intended to constitute a minimum 
standard, the Preamble does state, at paragraph 11, that "[elvery lawyer is 
responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Condu~t . "~  
Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that the Model Rules are intended to 
stand in the same relationship to lawyers' ethical and professional stan- 
dards in this regard as their predecessors in the Model Code. However, 
no such restraint is reflected in the passage dealing with civil liability. 
Following the Preamble of the Rules, in a section called "Scope," the 
following language appears, at paragraph 6: 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor 
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. 
The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to pro- 
vide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. 
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermorci, 
the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by 
opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just 
basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer 
under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply 
that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has stand- 
ing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the 
Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of 
lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a 
Underlying much of the discussion in this article is the belief that these 
disclaimers are virtually meaningless. Professor Geoffrey Hazard has put 
this proposition more artfully, as follows: 
These efforts [to exclude the application of the ethics codes from 
malpractice cases] were predictably futile, however, if not fatuous. 
Norms stated as obligatory standards of a vocation are generally held 
to be evidence of the legal standard of care in practicing that voca- 
tion, or at least as a predicate for expert testimony as to what that 
standard is. Thus, notwithstanding the bar's attempted disclaimer in 
writing black-letter rules, the bar necessarily assumed certain un- 
avoidable responsibilities. (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted).% 
28. Model Rules, Preamble. 
29. Model Rules, Scope. 
30. Geoffrey C. Hazard. Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get it, 
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In this context, it is notable that, in adopting their own versions of 
the ethics codes, not every state has incorporated the disclaimer language. 
Refemng again to the analogy of the car accident case with which this 
article began, the fact that speed limits were established for criminal law 
purposes does not prevent their use or limit their utility in determining 
civil negligence liability. In this light, the disclaimer language in the 
ethics codes purporting to preclude the parallel use of the ethics rules in 
legal malpractice cases as well as in disciplinary proceedings, and the 
decisions giving the disclaimers effect, appear to be purely self-serving 
on the part of the bar in seeking to have its members treated differently 
from other tortfeasors. 
Additionally, the Model Code and Model Rules may have different 
relevance in ascertaining the appropriate civil standard of liability, not- 
withstanding that each contains disclaimer statements. For a number of 
reasons, despite the stronger disclaimer language, the Model Rules pro- 
vide a more solid basis for a nexus between ethical and civil standards of 
conduct. 
First, the Rules are firmly rooted in positive law.3' The Rules were 
carefully crafted to track generally accepted principles of agency law." 
Agency concepts are at the heart of the attorney-client relationship, and 
the duty of care owed by lawyers to clients frequently can be described in 
terms of the responsibilities of agents to principals. Viewed in this light, 
the Rules and malpractice law have common roots. If ethics codes and 
substantive law reflect common standards, then it follows that the codi- 
fied rules would be germane to the question of professional standards in 
civil actions." 
The Rules also conform to court-made rules of law. The ABA com- 
mission that drafted the Rules incorporated civil standards into the pro- 
posed rules whenever they were r e l e ~ a n t . ~  For example, in the area of 
conflicts of interest, Model Rule 1.9 reflects the substantive standard for 
successive conflicts of interest in substantially related rnatter~.~' Rules 
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 718 (1993). 
31. See Robert J. Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standardr 
for the '80s and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J .  1 1  16, 1 1  16-1 117 (1981). 
32. See id. at 1 1  17-1 120; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 55 394 
(a), (c), (d) and cmt.; 381 (e) and cmt.; 396 (d) and cmt., (j); 281 (a) and cmt. 
covering principavagent relationship. 
33. See Maritrans 573 A.2d at 1001. 
34. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope. 
35. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.9(a). The history section of the rules consistently 
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7.1 through 7.4 attempt to codify standards for advertising and solicita- 
tion declared by the U.S. Supreme Court.% This reliance on substantive 
law throughout the Rules tends to produce common ethical and civil 
standards. 
Finally, the Rules recognize the role of customary usage in setting 
standards of behavior for lawyers. It was, and is, customary for lawyers 
to refer cases to other lawyers in return for a share of the ultimate fee in 
the case even if they handle none of the work.37 Rule 1.5(e) revised the 
requirements of the Code with respect to division of fees with other law- 
y e r ~ . ~ ~  It allows lawyers to divide fees without regard to the proportion 
of work done by each if the lawyers agree in writing to assume full re- 
sponsibility for the matter.39 This practice gives an incentive to lawyers 
who are not competent, or are too busy to undertake a particular case, to 
associate with another lawyer better positioned to assume the representa- 
tion." The proportional work/proportional pay provisions of the Code 
were widely disregarded by practitioners, thereby subjecting them to 
discipline for acting according to the custom of the profession!' The 
demonstrates the recognition of case law as supporting the positions adopted by the 
commission. 
36. "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
lawyer or the lawyer's services." MODEL RULES, Rule 7.1; ". . .[A] lawyer may 
advertise services through public media, such as a telephone, legal directory, news- 
paper or other periodical. . . . A lawyer may not give anything of value to a person 
for recommending the lawyer's services. . . . " MODEL RULES, Rule 7.2; "A lawyer 
shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from 
a prospective client. . . . " MODEL RULES, Rule 7.4. 
37. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 5 9.2.4 p. 510. (West 
1986). 
38. The MODEL CODE, in DR 2-107 dictated proportionality. "A lawyer shall not 
- - 
divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a in or asso- 
ciate of his law firm or law office, unless: . . . (2) [tlhe division is made in pro- 
portion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each. 
39. MODEL RULE 1.5 (e), "a division of fee between lawyers who are not in the 
same firm may be made only if: (1) the division is in proportion to the services 
performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer 
assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client is advised of and 
does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved: and (3) the total fee 
is reasonable." 
40. The comments to Rule 1.5 state, "[a] division of fee facilitates association of 
more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as 
well . . . ." Model Rule 1.5 Comment. 
41. Hall & Levy, Intra Attorney Fee-Sharing Arrangements, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 
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Rules acknowledged the reality of the practice of forwarding fees, and 
created a standard consistent with that practice.42 
Taken together, these approaches to the drafting of the Model Rules 
produced a document reflecting standards closer to those of civil law than 
the standards articulated in the Code.43 This conceptual convergence is 
clearly documented in the background sections of the Rules, so that the 
nexus between these two systems of standards can be identified easily."' 
Widespread adoption of the Model Rules represents a growing con- 
sensus about how lawyers ought to act, because the Rules now establish a 
cross-jurisdictional commonality of behavioral standards. Whether this 
can be translated into a duty to act in conformance to the standards artic- 
ulated in the rules is another question. In order to assess this question, it 
is necessary to look more closely at the purposes of the disciplinary sys- 
tem and evolving case law. 
111. TI-E DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM AND OTHER USES 
OF THE RULES OUTSIDE MALPRACTICE 
A. Discipline 
In contrast to malpractice, the disciplinary system is designed to 
protect the interests of the public and the integrity of the legal profession 
from the misconduct of lawyers.4s Because law is a self-regulating pro- 
fession, the integrity and credibility of all lawyers is impugned by the 
unsanctioned misconduct of any." Ethical rules spell out the individual 
lawyer's responsibilities to multiple groups, including clients, the pro- 
1 (1976); Note, Attorneys: The Referral Fee: A Split Opinion, 33 OKL. L. REV. 628 
(1980). 
42. MODEL RULES. Rule 1.5(e), Other Model Rules codified customary usage in 
similar ways. See Mallen & Smith. supra note 3, 8 16.3, at 410. 
43. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YAU L.J. 
1239, 1249 (1991). 
44. The extent to which the Model Code reflected agency, case law and custom 
is absent from its legislative history. That the disciplinary system and the court sys- 
tem might reach the same result for the same reasons reflected a degree of parallel- 
ism, but not necessarily conformity. 
45. See MODEL RULES. Scope; see also Wolfram. supra note 21. 
46. WOLFRAM, supra note 21. 
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fession, the courts, clients, and adversaries, among others.47 
Although the duties enumerated in the ethics codes serve to protect 
broader societal interests, the standards clearly address the quality of 
lawyers' conduct towards their clients. Thus, while it may be said to 
undermine the legal system if a lawyer misappropriates client funds, such 
misconduct obviously harms the client as well, and a rule prohibiting 
misappropriation of funds is equally relevant to both concerns." 
The disciplinary system may have been designed to protect the pro- 
fession as a whole and the public generally, but certain provisions of the 
ethical rules focus specifically on the duties of lawyers towards clients 
who look for their individual protection to the civil justice system. An 
individual injured by an attorney's malpractice may have a tort action, as 
well as a valid disciplinary complaint against the lawyer under the appli- 
cable ethical rules, providing a dual remedy for the same misc~nduct .~~  
The client can proceed under either system or b ~ t h . ~  
An adjudication under one system will not foreclose action under the 
other for the same act of miscond~ct.~' A successful prosecution under 
the disciplinary system requires a finding that the lawyer violated one or 
more rules prohibiting the lawyer's conduct?' If the rule involves con- 
duct which also subjects the lawyer to malpractice, the ethical rule argu- 
ably has a bearing on the lawyer's duty to act with reasonable care to- 
ward the client. 
B. Other Uses of the Rules 
Outside Malpractice 
Although courts continue to recite the disclaimers, discussed in Sec- 
tion 11, that ethical rules were not intended to be used as a basis for civil 
liability, the application of these disclaimers has been restricted largely to 
47. See MODEL RULES, Scope. 
48. See MODEL RULE 1.15; See also Model Code DR 9-102. 
49. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1979) a f d  407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980). 
50. See generally Harry J .  Haynsworth, Business Lawyers Under Fire - Poten- 
tial Ethical Sanctions and Liability, 4246 ALI-ABA 23. 
51. Insurance Management Associates, Inc. v. Miller, No. 91-c-931, 1994 WL 
362206. (The fact that a rule of professional conduct is involved is not dispositive 
of the issue of civil negligence.). 
52. In re Taylor, 363 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. 1977). 
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legal malpractice cases, and almost always as a justification for denying 
liabilit~.'~ In fact, examination of judicial decisions in a number of areas 
confirms that courts regularly cite ethical rules to support propositions , 
that augment or modify the civil law." This suggests that the courts' 
reliance on the Preamble language is at best selective, which raises seri- 
ous questions about the merit of such logic. The following is a non-ex- 
haustive review of some of the other situations in which the ethical codes 
have been applied. 
1. Conflicts.-Many of the rules that govern legal conflicts of inter- 
est had their origin in judicial decisions. In fact, the relationship between 
the substantive law as expressed in the case law has evolved in tandem 
with the ethical rules. Where the legal representation involves a former 
and a present client of a lawyer, courts have developed a rule that the 
lawyer cannot represent the present client against the former if the two 
matters are substantially related." Although this concept did not appear 
in either the Canons or the Code, it was incorporated in the Rules of Pro- 
fessional Conduct as Rule 1.9.56 
An examination of the cases involving the substantial relationship 
test demonstrates another aspect of this interrelationship: the courts cite 
the ethical rules with regularity to support their decisions applying the 
substantial relationship test." These decisions frequently undertake ex- 
53. See, e.g., Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 953 (Cal. 1994); Galu v. 
Attias, 923 F. Supp 590, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Carlson v. Fredrikson & Byron, 475 
N.W.2d 882, 888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
54. See infra notes 61, 65, 66, 68, and accompanying text. 
55. T.C. Theatre Cop. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). In this case, Judge Weinfield first articulated the substantial rela- 
tionship test: "the former client need show no more than that the matters embraced 
within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on behalf of his adver- 
sary are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney 
previously represented him, the former client." Id. at 268. Compare Model Rules. 
Rule 1.9: "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in 
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former 
client unless the former client consents after consultation." Model Rule 1.9(a). 
56. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Scope; MODEL CODE RESPONSIBILITY. 
Scope; MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9. 
57. See, e.g., Straub Clinic & Hospital v. Kochi, 917 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Haw. 
1996); Islander East Rental Program v. Ferguson, 917 F. Supp 504, 509 (S.D. Tex. 
1996). 
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tended discussions of the ethical rules in order to support their deci- 
s ion~.~"  
For example, when confronted with the issue of whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in granting an attorney's motion to withdraw 
as counsel shortly before trial, the Supreme Court of the Northern Marina 
Islands in Hwang Jae Corp. v. Marianas Trading and Development 
relied heavily on Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 as the basis for af- 
firming the trial court's decision. 
In one of the most widely cited conflicts decisions, Cinema 5, Ltd. v. 
Cinerama ~nc.,~' the court discussed at length the interrelationship be- 
tween Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as 
they relate to the limits of the substantial relationship test.61 In turning to 
the Code in this way, the court effectively utilized the ethics rules to 
define a fundamental rule of substantive law. 
For yet another example, United States v. Stalks62 was a criminal 
case where there was a relationship between the defendant's attorney and 
the attorney of a co-indictee. The court based its entire determination of 
the attorney's duty on Model Rules 1.7 and 1.10, and the  comment^.^^ 
While couched in terms of breach of fiduciary duty and not malprac- 
tice, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCloy v. C h ~ n , ~ ~  held that liability for breach of basic ethics standards 
(in this case, conflicts of interest arising from changing clients in the 
58. See, e.g., Callas v. Pappas, 907 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Crispens v. 
Casal Refining & Marketing, Inc., 897 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1995); Bagdan v. Beck, 140 
F.R.D. 660 (D.N.J. 1991). 
59. No. Civ. A. 88-889, 1994 WL 413190 (S. Ct. N. Mariana Islands, July 19, 
1994). 
60. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976). 
61. The issue was whether the substantial relationship test articulated in T.C. 
Theaters should be applied in cases involving concurrent conflicts of interest. After 
reviewing the ethical standards, the court concluded that it was not appropriate to 
extend the application of this rule to concurrent conflicts. T.C. Theaters, 113 F. 
Supp. at 268. 
62. Crim. No. 94-195 1994 WL 606060 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1994). 
63. Id. at *1-5. 
64. 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994). It should be noted that although the breach 
alleged was clearly founded in the ethical rules regulating conflicts of interest, the 
court did not expressly refer to the ethics code, instead founding its decision on 
general principles of fiduciary obligations. Precisely the same result would follow if 
the breaches had been expressed in terms of the ethics code. 
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middle of a commercial transaction without the consent of the original 
client), may be imposed without proof of "but for" causation of injury.65 
It 'is clear from these conflicts decisions that courts are willing to 
apply ethical rules in conflicts cases, even though an explicit discussion 
of whether ethical rules can provide a basis for substantive decisions does 
not appear in the opinions. It is also apparent that the civil law and the 
disciplinary rules have evolved synergistically over an extended period of 
time. This interactive growth is strong support for the argument that the 
ethical rules governing conflicts have relevance in the civil arena general- 
ly, and in legal malpractice cases ~pecifically.~~ 
2. Confidences.-An attorney's obligation to maintain a client's 
confidences is deeply rooted and broadly recognized as an essential part 
of the attorney-client relationship. Every state and the federal system, 
recognizes the attorney-client privilege in its rules of evidence:' and an 
ethical duty to protect client confidences appears in the various rules of 
attorney conduct of all  jurisdiction^.^ What is the role of the courts in 
ensuring that attorneys protect their clients' confidences, and what stan- 
dard do these courts employ in doing so? 
Smart Industries Corp. v. Superior Court et aL.@ was a civil case 
where defendant's counsel moved to disqualify the plaintiffs attorney 
because a former employee of defendant's attorney had worked on the 
case before leaving to take employment with plaintiffs attorney. The 
attorney's motion was not based upon statutory or common law, but on 
the Arizona rules governing attorney conduct.70 In rendering its decision, 
the Court of Appeals was careful to establish a relationship between 
ethical rules and motions made in court. The court staed that the ethical 
rules are adopted to provide attorneys with guidance in their actions and 
to provide a standard for disciplinary proceedings, although the rules do 
65. Id. at 543. 
66. In Simpson v. James, 903 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1990). the court found that 
attorneys' conflict of interest in a corporate transfer could provide a basis for legal 
malpractice if the malpractice proximately caused the plaintiffs' hann. Although the 
court did not rely upon the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct to reach its deci- 
sion, it is significant that identical conduct is involved in conflict situations regard- 
less of what remedy is sought. 
67. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 8 87 at 120 (4th ed., 1992). 
68. Id. 
69. 876 P.2d 1176 (Ariz. 1994). 
70. Id. at 1179. 
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not imply standing to use the rules in judicial applications." The court 
then went on to point out that a trial court derives authority to apply an 
ethical rule to govern a disqualification motion in a litigation setting from 
the inherent power of the court to control judicial officers in the proceed- 
ings before it, thus creating a body of common law based upon these 
rules.72 Such a convoluted argument appears to put form over substance. 
What the court is saying, in effect, is that courts may utilize the ethical 
rules when they choose, but that they may be compelled to choose to do 
so. Cases such as Smart make it clear that the courts are willing to em- 
ploy state standards of attorney conduct as well as the Model Rules as a 
tool in finding the correct substantive rule of law. 
3. Duty to Tribunal.-The courts have also utilized various ethical 
rules in establishing the attorney's duty to the tribunal. In Keith v. Jack- 
son, et. ~ l . , ' ~  the court raised the issue of an attorney's candor towards 
the tribunal, sua sponte, and found that he had violated Rule 3.3(d) of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court concluded that 
the most appropriate action for it to take under the circumstances was to 
revoke the attorney's pro hac vice admission. 
4. Legal Fees.--Courts are often faced with the question of whether 
the fees charged by an attorney are appropriate or excessive. This issue 
can arise in virtually all areas of legal practice. Model Rule 1.5 addresses 
not only the reasonableness of fees charged by attorneys, but also the 
division of fees between firms.74 Courts have not been shy to utilize this 
Rule to guide them in their resolution of issues surrounding attorney 
fees." 
5. Marketing Legal Services.-Perhaps no area of legal ethics has 
produced more judicial controversy than that of legal advertising and 
solicitation. Since 1977, when the Supreme Court decided Bates v. State 
71. Id. at 1180. 
72. Id. 
73. 855 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
74. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.5. 
75. See Ryder v. Farmland Mutual Ins. Co.. 248 Kan. 352, 807 P.2d 109 (Kan. 
1991); In re Estate of Schuldt, 428 N.W.2d 251 (S.D. 1988); Village of Shorewood 
v. Steinberg, et al.. 496 N.W.2d 57 (Wis. 1993). 
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Bar of Arizona," the Supreme Court and various state courts have been 
called upon to apply constitutional doctrines of commercial speech to 
state ethical rules.n Although most of these cases involve disciplinary 
actions, some decisions involve civil remedies for alleged attorney mis- 
conduct. 
In one such case, Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Ep- 
stein," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that lawyers leaving a 
law firm to open their own practice interfered with the existing contractu- 
al advantage between their old firm and its clients. Epstein, one of the 
departing lawyers who were associates at Adler Barish, actively "advised 
Adler Barish clients that he was leaving the firm and advised them that 
they could choose to be represented by him, Adler Barish, or any other 
firm or att~rney."'~ Citing DR 2-103 of the applicable Pennsylvania 
Code of Professional Resp~nsibility,~" the court goes on to say: 
We find nothing in the "'rules of the game' which society has adopt- 
ed" which sanctions appellees' conduct. Indeed, the rules which 
apply to those who enjoy the privilege of practicing law in the Com- 
monwealth expressly disapprove appellees' method of obtaining cli- 
ents. . . . We find such a departure from "[rlecognized ethical codes" 
"significant in evaluating the nature of [appellees'] conduct." Restate- 
ment (Second) of Torts, . . . at $767 comment c. All the reasons 
underlying our Disciplinary Rules' proscription . . . are relevant 
here."" 
The opinion is thus clear in stating that the ethical rules govern- 
ing the legal profession are relevant in assessing a lawyer's conduct 
76. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
77. Although a full discussion of the legal advertising cases is beyond the scope 
of this article, a sampling of the decisions confirms that there are many of them. 
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz, 433 U.S. 350, (1977); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re R.M.J., 
455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
78. 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978). 
79. Id. at 1178. 
80. "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of 
himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice 
regarding the employment of a lawyer." DR 2-103(A) Pennsylvania Code of Rofes- 
sional Responsibility (as adopted 1974). The court went on to discuss the constitu- 
tional legal advertising and solicitation decisions of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 
433 U.S. 350 (1977), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
which subsequently provided the foundation for Model Rules 7.1-7.3. 
81. Adler, 393 A.2d at 1184. 
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in a tort action based on a theory of interference with contractual 
advantage. 
For purposes of the discussion in this article, it is not necessary 
to establish that courts invariably turn to the ethical codes in civil 
actions, but rather to recognize that they do so, which leads inexora- 
bly to the conclusion that they can. 
IV. LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
The elements of the tort of legal malpractice needs to be reviewed, 
since this provides the framework for the entire discussion of the rele- 
vance of the ethics codes to this form of civil liability. There are five 
elements which must be established in order to prove a malpractice case 
against an attorney: 
1 .  Existence of a Professional Relationship: In the case of attorney 
malpractice, this requirement simply means that the plaintiff must show 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship. If a plaintiff cannot show 
that the relationship existed, then the matter usually can go no further. 
2. The Standard of Care: An attorney must act as a reasonable law- 
yer of ordinary prudence would in similar circumstances. Except in cases 
of egregious conduct, expert testimony as to custom and usage in the 
profession is required to establish professional negligence. This is the 
element which is at issue in this article. The question is whether the 
ethical rules in force in each jurisdiction should themselves establish the 
standard whenever they apply to allegations of malpra~tice.'~ 
3. Breach of the Standard of Care: It must be established, typically 
by expert testimony, that the attorney's conduct fell short of the standard 
of care. These two elements are related, but distinct. Having proved what- 
ever standard of conduct the attorney's actions should be measured 
against, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that a reasonable lawyer 
would not have acted as the defendant did in some identifiable way.83 
82. See infra notes 95, 127, 129, 132, 133, 143 and accompanying text. 
83. Typically, both the standard of care and its breach are established by expert 
testimony; in this sense, the question might be recast to inquire whether an expert 
should be permitted to use ethical standards in order to demonstrate reasonable care 
or the breach of it. 
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4. Proximate Cause: Next, the plaintiff must prove that the breach 
was the proximate cause of injury or loss," sometimes stated that the 
defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs 
harm." In order to establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must show 
that she would have prevailed in the underlying action upon which the 
malpractice case is based. 
5. Damages: Finally, the plaintiff must prove that she suffered actual 
injury or loss, compensable in the form of It is not enough 
that the lawyer was careless i i  general? or negligent toward the public 
at large,88 or to the interests of the legal profe~sion.'~ The plaintiff in a 
civil lawsuit for malpractice against his lawyer must suffer an injury 
represented by actual darn age^.^ 
84. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994). 
an action arising out of a claim of conflict of interest, but framed as a breach of 
fiduciary duty, rather than malpractice, the Court found that the traditional "but for" 
causation test was not required. Instead, the Court held that if the firm's conduct 
was a "substantial factor" in causing her loss, she could prevail. Accordingly, her $2 
million verdict was upheld. See note supra, note 70. 
85. Prosser, supra note 1, $ 41, at 267. 
86. See Hooper v. Gill, 557 A.2d 1349 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). cerf. denied. 
564 A.2d 1182 (Md. 1989). 
87. May01 v. Summers, Watson & Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d 1176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(An attorney's error in judgment does not necessarily establish liability for malprac- 
tice). 
88. Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 
1991) (The mere appearance of impropriety may give rise to a disciplinary action 
but not suffice for a civil remedy). 
89. Ann Peters The Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 609 (1993) Peters discusses the role of ethical rules in legal malprac- 
tice actions. She articulates the reluctance of courts to utilize the violation of an 
ethical rule as negligence per se, a rebuttable presumption of malpractice, or even 
evidence of the standard of care. She opines that the courts should utilize the rules 
to a much greater extent than they do. Id. 
90. Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, at 889-890. 
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A. The Plaintiff 
A tort action for legal malpractice represents a mechanism for com- 
pensating individuals injured by a lawyer acting in a professional capaci- 
ty.91 Most often the victirn/plaintiff is a client or former client whose 
cause of action arises during the course of the professional relation- 
ship.92 
There are, however, a number of cases where the existence of the 
relationship has been disputed. The issue in these cases arises most fre- 
quently when the attorney alleges that he declined the representation at 
the outset, and should bear no liability for the subsequent consequences. . 
The cases on this issue generally hold that if the individual subjectively 
and reasonably believes that the attorney represents him or her, that belief 
establishes the fiduciary element of the attorney-client relationship. In 
turn, even though no contractual engagement may have been established, 
the attorney thereby owes the client the obligations of an attorney suffi- 
cient to establish the existence of the duty of care.93 
The courts have demonstrated varying degrees of reluctance to find 
liability in favor of persons who are not clients of the lawyer.% The 
privity requirement in professional liability has proved more durable than 
in other areas such as products liability." 
In Greycas v. Proud,% Judge Posner held that a lawyer who mis- 
represented the net worth of the lawyer's brother-in-law was liable to a 
91. Mallen & Smith. supra note 2, at 2. 
92. Id. at 3. 
93. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 
1980) (A smaller number of cases have held attorneys liable to third party benefi- 
ciaries of attorney-client relationships where the agreed purposes of the transaction or 
relationship was to benefit the plaintiff). See, e.g., Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 
618 (Md. 1985). 
94. See Claggett v. Lacey, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). But see Greycas 
v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987). 
95. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Brooks v. 
Zebre, 792 P.2d 196 (Wyo. 1990). 
96. 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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prospective lender who relied on the lawyer's representations. Judge 
Posner stated that "[wlhere as in this case the defendant makes the negli- 
gent misrepresentation directly to the plaintiff in the course of the 
defendant's business or profession, the courts have little difficulty in 
finding a duty of care."97 Greycas was argued on a theory of misrepre- 
sentation rather. than legal malpra~tice.~' While Greycas does represent a 
willingness on the part of at least one court to find liability to one other 
than the client, it does not necessarily extend the pure malpractice theory 
beyond injured clients. 
In another significant case, the New York Court of Appeals in Pru- 
dential Insurance Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood,99 
relying on Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Ander~on,'"~ held that an at- 
torney could be held liable for a negligent misrepresentation to an insurer 
for whom the law firm produced documents that incorrectly stated the 
amount of a security interest in ships of the firm's client.I0' Although 
the defendant was relieved of liability on other grounds, the court ex- 
pressly stated that attorneys could be liable to third parties who specifi- 
97. Greycas, 826 F.2d at 1565 (quoting PROSSER & K E ~ N  ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS $ 107. at 747 (5th ed. 1984)). 
98. Judge Posner notes, however, that the analysis and result would be virtually 
the same if the case were argued under a theory of legal malpractice. Id. at 1563. 
The willingness to ignore the traditional privity requirement where the relationship 
between the attorney and the beneficiary of information is close may portend further 
erosion in the future. There is certainly no theoretical impediment to professional 
liability law going the same way as the law of products liability. 
99. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 
N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1992). 
100. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 
1985). 
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual 
parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial reports. certain 
prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have been aware 
that the financial reports were to be used for a particular purpose or 
purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was 
intended to rely; and (3) there must have been some conduct on the 
part of the accountants linking them to that party or parties, which 
evidences accountants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance. 
Id. at 118. 
101. Prudential, N.E.2d at 322. The decision ultimately found for the attorney on 
the ground that the facts did not prove a breach of duty. Id. at 323. At the same 
time, the court recognized the Credit Alliance test, and reaffirmed Ultramares v. 
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, decided by the same court in 1931. 
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cally rely on negligent misrepresentations in certain  circumstance^.^^^ 
These cases and others represent a growing tendency for courts to 
find liability against legal professionals for conduct outside the traditional 
lawyer-client relationship. When there is a relationship between the attor- 
ney and a non-client, in which the lawyer gives advice that is relied on 
by the non-client, it is not a big leap to say that the attorney should exer- 
cise ordinary professional care in giving the advice. 
On the other hand, in other cases, courts generally have refused to 
find lawyers liable when sued on grounds of malicious prosecution, 
where the lawyer represented a client unsuccessfully in a lawsuit against 
another. Typical of this sort of case are malicious prosecution actions by 
doctors who have successfully defended medical malpractice suits.lo3 
Since the attorney's primary responsibility is to represent her client zeal- 
ously, there is no general duty with regard to an adverse party, and ab- 
sent a specific intent to harm the other party through the litigation, the 
attorney will not be civilly responsible for prosecuting the action.lod 
The reason that these actions fail is that there has been no direct 
harm to someone for whom the law provides a remedy.lo5 It is in these 
cases that courts often state that ethical rules cannot independently create 
a cause of action: a finding of liability to non-clients would create a new 
class of plaintiffs. 
102. Id. at 322. 
103. See Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1981). 
104. Whether frivolous litigation, harassing tactics, unnecessary delay. and other 
hardball practices should be actionable is beyond the scope of this article. One could 
make the argument that such insupportable conduct breaches a duty of care to fore- 
seeable persons, and that if the. conduct proximately causes injury to such a person, 
the lawyer should be civilly liable. The courts have been willing to put aside the 
privity requirement in other areas such as products liability; see McPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., supra note 101. Prosser, 'The Assault Upon the Citadel." And the dis- 
tinction between products and services is easily strained. Presently, Rule 11 and 
disciplinary sanctions represent the first line of defense against abusive tactics. Feder- 
al Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11; Model Rules, Rules 3.1, 4.1, 4.2. These sanc- 
tions do not, however, provide a remedy for an individual who is actually harmed 
by the attorney's use of improper tactics. 
105. These situations can be distinguished from those in which a non-client ad- 
verse party is actually harmed by the lawyer's conduct. Thus, where an ethical rule 
protects the integrity of the legal system, e.g., Model Rule 3.3 "Candor to the Tribu- 
nal," it may be said that the xule was not intended to protect the class of persons 
comprised of non-client adverse parties. 
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B. Custom and Expert Testimony 
An essential aspect of the professional standard of care is the notion 
that the reasonableness of particular conduct engaged in by members of a 
group may be established by looking at the conduct of other members of 
the group in similar circumstances. A lawyer of ordinary and reasonable 
prudence must exercise at least the degree of care customary in the juris- 
diction for the legal service in~olved."~ Except in cases of gross negli- 
gence where the breach of the standard of care is so obvious that jurors 
do not need further guidance,"' customary practice must be established 
by expert testimony with reference to the conduct of lawyers in the 
state.''' Although the standard may shift from time to time and place to 
place, it is well settled that both duty and breach are defined by custom 
as articulated through the eyes of an expert. If plaintiff and defendant in- 
troduce competing experts, the jury will have to weigh the testimony of 
each.'09 
Increasingly, expert witnesses are pointing to ethics rules as evidence 
of what the standard of care ought to be, in addition to anecdotal evi- 
dence about common practices, whether such practices establish a duty, 
and whether the defendant lawyer breached that duty."' This tendency 
has forced courts to decide whether to admit such testimony, and if ad- 
mitted, how to treat the ethical rules implicated in the testimony. 
An intriguing question is how a custom becomes a duty. The exam- 
ple of confidentiality illustrates the point. Although there is an evidentiary 
privilege covering communications between lawyer and client, the cus- 
tomary practice is that lawyers, in the course of representing clients, 
maintain confidentiality as to matters that extend beyond the privilege to 
other matters relating to the representation."' This broader concept of 
confidentiality is articulated in the Model Code as client  secret^,"^'^ 
106. See Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 165; Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 
359 N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 1985). 
107. See, e.g, Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984) (failure to appear 
in court); Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 270 A.2d 662 (Md. 1970) (failure to notify 
client of termination of representation); Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 
443 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (failure to settle upon client's request). 
108. Richmond v. Nodland, 501 N.W.2d 759 (N.D. 1993). 
109. Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, at 8 27.18 p.684. 
110. Brewer, Wilbum, Expert Witness Testimony in Legal Malpractice Cases. 45 
S.C. L. REV. 727 (Summer 1994). 
111 .  See Bayes v. Theran, 639 N.E.2d 720 (Mass. 1994). 
112. In DR 4-101, the Model Code distinguishes between "client confidences" and 
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and in the Model Rules as "information relating to the representa- 
tion.""' In the case of a lawyer whose breach of unprivileged but confi- 
dential information causing arguable harm to a client, an expert would 
have to testify that the customary practice of lawyers is to protect such 
confidences, that the custom amounted to a duty, and that the lawyer 
breached the duty by revealing the confidence. The act of revealing client 
confidences in this example would also violate Model Rule 1.6,"' or 
DR 4-101 under the Code."' Testimony that the custom of confidential- 
ity was codified as an ethical rule in all likelihood would bolster the 
argument that the custom established a duty of care.'I6 
Accepting, arguendo, that civil actions for malpractice and the disci- 
plinary system have very different aims, it is still very likely that the two 
systems rely on many of the same customs as a basis for their standards 
of conduct. If the standards are based on common customs, then it fol- 
lows that the codified expression of such customs would be relevant in an 
action where the custom is required to establish a duty of professional 
care. 
C. The Search for Standards 
The concept of negligence per se for violation of a statutory enact- 
ment is a doctrine of longstanding application in the law of torts, wherein 
a court adopts a standard of conduct articulated in a legislative statute as 
the standard of care for tort liability."' Such standards are frequently 
"client secrets" by stating that a "confidence" is "information protected by the attor- 
neyclient privilege under applicable law" while a "secret" is "other information 
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate 
or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detri- 
mental to the client." 
113. Model Rule 1.6 on confidentiality of information does away with the Model 
Code's distinction between "confidences" and "secrets" by referring only to "infonna- 
tion relating to representation." 
114. See MODEL RULES. Rule 1.6. 
1 15. See MODEL CODE, DR 4- 101. 
116. Arguments against allowing such testimony are frequently grounded in the 
belief that the duty can be articulated without reference to ethical standards, the use 
of which is inevitably prejudicial. Proponents of allowing the testimony recognize 
that while it may be highly persuasive, persuasiveness is not tantamount to prejudice. 
See note 78 supra, and accompanying text. 
117. Pmsser, supra note 1, $36. 
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but not always drawn from criminal statutes."' For the tort plaintiff 
seeking to show breach of a duty, or the defendant trying to prove the 
plaintiffs lack of care, negligence per se obviates the need to produce 
other more problematic evidence of duty and breach of the duty of rea- 
sonable care.l19 
Practically, proof that another party violated a statute may prove to 
be very persuasive to a jury regardless of the legal weight assigned to it 
by the court. Although different jurisdictions attach different weight to 
proof of a statutory violation, the three common positions are that the 
violation amounts to negligence per se in the absence of excuse, that it 
creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence, and that it is evidence of 
negligence to be considered by the jury with all the other evidence.''' 
A significant number of jurisdictions already allow the violation of 
an ethical rule to be introduced as evidence of negligence in a legal mal- 
practice case.12' In these jurisdictions, ethical violations are viewed as 
relevant to the question of civil liability, and considered with all the other 
evidence by the jury. Among the other evidence considered by the jury in 
most cases is expert testimony as to customary practice.122 Although the 
fact that an attorney has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
profession may prove to be highly persuasive to a lay jury, in most juris- 
dictions an ethical violation does not create either a presumption of negli- 
gence or negligence per se in a legal malpractice case. 
A few courts have held that violation of an ethical rule raises a pre- 
sumption of malpracti~e.'~~ In these states, in order to avoid a directed 
118. Id at 220. 
119. Id. at 230. 
120. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Elliot v. Videan. 791 P.2d 639, 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (allowed 
jury instruction which mentioned Rules of Professional Conduct since jury was ad- 
vised that violation of the Rules "are merely evidence that [the jury] may consider"); 
Pressley v. Farley. 579 So. 2d 160. 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("A violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . may be used as some evidence of negli- 
gence."); Fishman v. Brooks. 487 N.E.2d 1377. 1381 (Mass. 1986) ("A violation of 
a canon of ethics or a disciplinary rule . . . may be some evidence of the attorney's 
negligence."); Lipton v. Boesky. 313 N.W.2d. 163. 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) ("[A] 
violation of the Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice."); Albright v. Bums, 503 
A.2d 386. 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("Where an attorney fails to meet 
the minimum standard of competence governing the profession, such failure can be 
considered evidence of malpractice."). 
122. See Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.2d 683 @.C. 1988). 
123. See Lipton, supra note 127; Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum. 359 N.W.2d 865 
Heinonline - -  22 J. Legal Prof. 58 1 9 9 8  
Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice 
verdict, the party against whom the presumption is raised is required to 
come forward with evidence tending to show: 1) that there was no viola- 
tion, or 2) justification.'" If such rebuttal evidence is proffered, the jury 
must weigh the totality of the evidence, but if the party fails to come for- 
ward with evidence to rebut the presumption, an adverse verdict will re- 
sult.'= 
Only one jurisdiction has gone as far as to say that violation of an 
ethical rule is negligence per Day v. Rosenthall" argues that the 
applicable ethics code actually establishes a civil right giving rise to an 
automatic remedy. A number of courts nevertheless adhere to the position 
preferred by many in the organized bar, that evidence of an ethical viola- 
tion is inadmissible in a civil case against an attorney.12' One of the 
most frequently cited reasons for the prohibition is that mention of the 
Rules and the disciplinary system is likely to be prejudicial to a jury.lZ9 
Some courts will permit an expert to describe an attorney's misconduct 
with the language of the ethical rules while precluding mention of the 
Rules by narne.l3" 
Frequently, courts have used language to the effect that the violation 
of an ethical rule does not create an independent cause of action.13' 
Often citing language in the Preamble of the Code and Rules that the 
ethical rules are not intended to provide a basis for civil liability, or give 
(N.D. 1985). 
124. See Prosser, supra note 1. 
125. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301; Dooley v. Darling 324 N.E.2d 684, 693 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1975); Cockrill v. Smith, 1993 WL 392061 (Ohio. App. 9 Dist.); JOHN 
WILLIAM STRONG Er AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 8 344 at 582 (4th ed. 1992). 
126. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
127. Id. 
128. See Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992). 
129. Jury instructions "may not refer to the CPR of RPC' because "an expert's 
mention of them or their use as the basis of jury instructions could mislead the jury 
into believing the CPR and RPC conclusively establish the standard of 
care--precisely the result we wish to avoid." Id. at 654. This position seems to hold 
not only that the Rules are relevant, but that they are too relevant. 
130. Hizey, 830 P.2d 646. 
131. Webster v. Powell, 391 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). rev. denied, 394 
S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 1990), a f d  399 S.E.2d 113 (N.C. 1991) (breach of Code of Pro- 
fessional Responsibility not a basis for civil liability); Rios v. McDermott, Will and 
Emery, 613 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
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rise to a cause of ac t i~n , "~  these courts articulate a fear that some new 
theory of liability could spring from the pages of the Rules to the sub- 
stantive law governing the liability of lawyers. As this Article demon- 
strates, the ethical rules do not support the concept of an independent 
cause of action, but rather point to the existence of a, standard of care 
within the framework of existing law. 
Discussion about whether ethical rules give rise to an independent 
cause of action d i v d  attention from. the real questions: (1) When is 
consideration of ethical violations appropriate, i.e., in what situations does 
the violation reflect the standard in the civil action? (2) How much 
weight should courts give to such evidence? Courts have addressed the 
second question, but not the first, avoiding the issue by reciting the shib- 
boleth about the Rules not creating an independent cause of action. What 
is needed is a formula to determine when rule violations are relevant. 
The American Law Institute Draft of the Restatement of 'the Law 
Governing Lawyers represents a. novel approach to the problem."' The 
Restatement purports to define a set of legal principles and standards 
from a variety of sources that govern lawyers' conduct. Like other Re- 
statements, such as Torts or contracts, the Restatement of the Law Gov- 
erning Lawyers could be introduced into evidence in a malpractice action 
free from the baggage of the Model Rules or Code.'" On the other 
hand, the Restatement would not carry with it whatever force of law the 
ethical codes might imply. The Restatement, however, represents another 
basis to support using ethical standards in civil cases if it supports con- 
formity between the Rules and extrinsic law. In any event, until the Re- 
statement is formally adopted by the A.L.I., its potential effect is specula- 
tive at best."' 
The attempt to codify the law governing lawyers, if it is being done 
in order to give courts an alternative basis for finding a standard of care, 
132. See supra note 5. 31. 32 and accompanying text. 
133. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Discussion Draft 1992). 
134. Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 21 1. 
135. The American Law Institute is presently bogged down in the drafting of the 
Resstatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. A draft was presented to the body in 
May 1994, debated extensively, and sent back to committee for more work. The 
debate illustrates the difficulty of reaching consensus on professional standards of 
conduct, if not in all areas, at least in some, e.g.. limits on the lawyer's duty of 
confidentiality. It is likely that the continuing discussion of a few controversial issues 
will delay passage of the entire package for some time. 
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is misguided. A restatement may be persuasive at best, but it lacks the 
authority of true statutory enactments. Ethical codes, based upon the 
Model Code or Model Rules carry with them a legal imperative: in a 
fundamental way, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would not violate an 
ethical rule that sets a standard protecting his client from harm. 
Given the three basic approaches courts give to evidence of statutory 
violations, there are essentially four clearly identifiable possible alterna- 
tive rules for dealing with the use or admission of ethics codes within 
malpractice litigation: the three approaches described above, and a fourth, 
excluding' evidence of ethical violations to establish the standard of care. 
These alternatives are described below with reference to a single case 
where each position was adopted. The section which follows contains a 
full analysis, on a state-by-state basis, of how widely each alternative is 
currently accepted or adopted. 
Under the first alternative, proof of a violation of an ethical stan- 
dard'36 is negligence per se.I3' Following the second approach, proof 
136. Throughout this section, reference to an ethical standard refers to a mandato- 
ry or disciplinary provision of a state's version of the Model Code or Model Rules 
in force in the jurisdiction. Although most of the discussion in this article refers to 
the ABA's Model Code and Model Rules, whatever force of law attaches to the 
ethical codes is derived from their adoption as standards of professional conduct in a 
particular jurisdiction. Under all three basic formulations, the plaintiff must still es- 
tablish all the elements of the tort of legal malpractice-relationship, duty, breach, 
causation, and damages. Evidence as to violation of the ethical rules is germane to 
the elements of duty and breach only. 
137. The case which comes closest to stating this proposition is Day v. Rosenthal, 
217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1985), cerr. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). 
The standards governing an attorney's ethical duties are conclusively 
established by the Rules of Professional Conduct. They cannot be 
changed by expert testimony. If an expert testifies contrary to the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the standards established by the rules govern 
and the expert testimony is disregarded. 
Of course, a judge may resort to expert testimony to establish the 
standard of care when that standard is not a matter of common knowl- 
edge, or where the attorney is practicing in a specialized field. However, 
Rosenthal's numerous, blatant and egregious violations of attorney re- 
sponsibility were not breaches of legal technicalities for which expert 
testimony is required. They were violations of professional standards of 
which the trial court was compelled to take notice. 
Id. at 102-03 
However, it should be noted that this California case probably goes further- 
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of a violation of an ethical rule will raise a rebuttable presumption that 
the applicable standard of care has been breached.I3* Utilizing alterna- 
tive three, the violation of an ethical rule may be used as evidence of the 
applicable standard of care, but the trier of fact must determine the appli- 
cable standard of care.139 Under the final alternative, the fact that an 
ethical rule has been violated may not be introduced as evidence of the 
applicable standard of care, and it is for the trier of fact to determine the 
applicable standard of care without reference to the rule.la The balance 
of this article is devoted to demonstrating the degree to which each of the 
alternatives either has been or should be adopted as the appropriate stan- 
dard. 
1. Negligence Per Se.-The standard proposed by the negligence 
per se alternative argues that the applicable ethics code actually establish- 
es a standard of conduct giving rise to an automatic remedy if it is violat- 
ed. Apart from the Day v. Rosenthal case,141 no other court has clearly 
enunciated this particular position.14* It clearly goes too far, not because 
of the disclaimers in the ethics codes, but because it does not give the 
defendant a reasonable opportunity to establish a valid excuse for violat- 
ing the rule.143 
perhaps because of its particular facts-than the rule elsewhere expressed by California 
courts, as exemplified by the Mirabito case. See also Mayol v. Summers. Watson & 
Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d 1176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 
(Mass. 1986). 
138. Mirabito v. Liccardo, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (Ct. App. 1992). 
139. Fishman v. Brooks. 487 N.E.2d 1377 (1986). 
140. Hizey, note 3 supra. 
141. See supra note 133. 
142. A New Jersey Court has recently explicitly rejected the Alternative 1 rule, at 
least in the context of claims against opposing counsel. Baxt v. Liloia, N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. No. A-1101-93T2, 3/13/95; reported in 11 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 
144. 
143. Even though the plaintiff in an action based on negligence per se must 
prove all the elements of the tort, the danger for the defendant is that the jury may 
be so influenced by the statutory violation establishing duty and breach that they 
will give short shrift the elements of causation and damages, that is, that there must 
be a nexus between the violation by the defendant and the plaintiffs actual harm. 
For instance, although couched in terms of breach of fiduciary duty and not mal- 
practice, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in its recent decision of Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Chan. 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994). held that liability 
for breach of basic ethics standards (in this case, conflicts of interest arising from 
changing clients in the middle of a commercial transaction without the consent of 
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2. Rebuttable Presumption.-The standard suggested in second 
alternative that proof of the existence of an applicable ethical rule creates 
a rebuttable presumption that the defendant has violated the relevant 
standard of care avoids the harshness of a pure negligence per se rule, 
but it is notable that only three states have adopted it.144 In the Mirabito 
decision, the California Court of Appeal expressly held that "[ilt is well 
established that an attorney's duties to his client are governed by the 
rules of professional conduct. Those rules, together with statutes and 
general principles relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define 
the duty component of the fiduciary duty which an attorney owes to his 
client."145 
3. Evidence of Negligence.-The third alternative position is that 
the violation of an ethical rule may be used as evidence of the requisite 
standard of care in establishing malpractice liability. This rule provides 
for the admission of the same evidence as under the second alternative, 
but gives to the finder of fact the ultimate decision as to the actual stan- 
dard to be applied, and, therefore, the power to disregard the standard of 
care embodied in the ethics code. It is notable that of the jurisdictions 
considering the issue, a plurality of twenty states and the District of Co- 
lumbia, have adopted this evidence of negligence standard.146 Obiter 
the original client), may be imposed without proof of "but for" causation of injury. 
Notwithstanding cases such as Milbank, which may be viewed as particular to its 
own unusual facts, the proposition contained in the negligence per se alternative is 
too extreme a position for these authors' comfort. 
144. See, e.g.. Mirabito, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 571 (involving a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim); Cornell v. Wunschel. 408 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1987) (involving a claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation); Beattie v. Firnschild, 394 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that violation of an ethical rule creates a rebuttable presumption of 
malpractice); and Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
145. 5 Cal. Rptr.2d. 571 (citing Day v. Rosenthal 217 Cal. Rptr. 89). 
146. See the following: Arizona-Elliott v. Videan, 791 P.2d 639 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1989). review denied, 801 P.2d 426 (Ariz. 1990); Colorado-Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. 
Paynter, 841 F.2d 348 (10th Cir.1988); District of Columbia-Waldman v. Levine, 544 
A.2d 683 (D.C. 1988); Florida-Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. 
Supp. 194 (N.D. Fla. 1985) (involving a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Pressley v. 
Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 1991); Georgia-Allen v. Lekoff, Duncan, Grimes 
& Derrner, P.C., Ga. Sup. Ct, No. S94G1071, 2J27/95, reported at ABAlBNA Law- 
yers Manual on Professional Conduct, Vol. 11, p.77; see also Findley v. Davis, 414 
S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Roberts v. Langdale, 363 S.E.2d 591 (Ga. Ct. App. 
Heinonline - -  22 J. Legal Prof. 63 1998 
The Journal of the Legal Profession [Vol. 22:33 
dicta in a recent case whose actual holding was a rejection of the negli- 
gence per se alternative, suggests that New Jersey may also be added to 
the list.I4' 
It is important here to point out the distinction between the rules 
contained in the second and third alternatives. In the case of a rebuttable 
presumption, once it is established that there is an ethical rule governing 
the conduct in issue, no other evidence on the issue of the standard of 
care is required; all that remains is to prove breach (that the standard was 
violated) and that the breach caused the resulting injury.148 This ap- 
proach clearly applies the standards articulated in the ethics codes as the 
basis for the establishment of the standard of care requisite for malprac- 
tice liability. Since the ethics codes themselves create minimum standards 
of attorney conduct, it may be argued that they should equally be deemed 
to constitute statements of the standard against which "reasonable" or 
"normal" attorneys are to be 
Thus, the rebuttable presumption approach is theoretically the most 
1987); Idaho-Johnson v. Jones, 652 P.2d 650 (Idaho 1982); Illinois-Nagy v. Beckley, 
578 N.E.2d 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Indiana-Sanders v. Townsend, 582 N.E.2d 355 
(Ind. 1991), cert. denied, sub nom, Benirschke v. Indiana, 577 N.E.2d 576 (1991). 
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 (1992); Kansas-Nelson v. Miller. 607 P.2d 438 (Kan. 
1980); Massachusetts-Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986); Minnesota- 
Carlson v. Fredrickson & Byron, P.A., 475 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); 
Missouri-Greening v. Klamen. 652 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Montana- 
Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1987); New York-Kleeman v. Rheingold, 
614 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1993); North Carolina-Booher v. Frue, 394 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1990). review denied, 395 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1990) (involving a breach of 
fiduciary duty); North Dakota-Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum. 359 N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 
1985); Ohio-David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., 605 N.E.2d 1259 
(Ohio 1993); Oregon-Kidney Ass'n of Oregon Inc. v. Ferguson, 843 P.2d 442 (Or. 
1992) (involving a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Pennsylvania-Rizzo v. Haines, 
555 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1989); South Carolina-Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & 
Geurard. 472 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 19%); Tennessee-Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 
(6th Cir. 1980), cerr. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. 
Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1991). 
147. Baxt v. Liloia, 664 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
148. The defendant, of cou&, may introduce evidence or justification or excuse 
in order to rebut the presumption of negligence. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 36, 
226. 
149. "Normal" is the strange tern used in the latest draft of the American Law 
Institute's Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers would have it, Tentative Draft 
No. 7 (Apr. 7. 1994). Chapter 4. "[A] lawyer who owes a duty of care must exer- 
cise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circum- 
stances, . . . " Lawyer Civil Liability, 8 74 (1) (emphasis added). 
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accurate possible definition of the relationship between the provisions of 
the ethics codes and the standard of care in malpractice-the provisions 
of the ethics codes define the standard of care in all instances where, and 
to the extent that the codes state the minimum standard of conduct for 
attorneys in dealing with their clients. This alternative, however, tends to 
substitute the ethics codes for the decision-making responsibilities of the 
finder-of-fact, and this may produce rigid decisions with slavish adher- 
ence to the codified ethical standards to the exclusion of other consider- 
a t i on~ . ' ~  
4. No Evidence.-Five. states take a position that evidence of the 
applicable .ethical rules may not be introduced into evidence to establish 
the requisite standard of care in malpractice cases, including the State of 
Washington in Hizey.ls' This alternative is the least appealing of the four 
because it does not give any weight to standards that are obviously relat- 
ed to the reasonableness of lawyers' conduct with respect to their clients. 
It takes away from the trier of fact an important tool to help understand 
and apply the professional standard of care. 
Ronald R. Mallen, the author of the leading text on the subjedt,lS2 
is clearly in the camp of those who would prefer to exclude all reference 
to the ethics codes from malpractice cases. ?he Supreme Court of Wash- 
ington in HizeylS3 represents the most recent and thorough exposition of 
judicial reluctance towards the use of ethics codes in malpractice cases. 
150. For example, suppose a lawyer revealed a client's confidential information 
that the client was infected with the .HIV virus and had possibly infected one or 
more individuals who were unaware of the risk of infection. It would be a breach of 
confidentiality and a clear violation of Model Rule 1.6 to reveal this information to 
the potential victims. It is more likely. however, that a jury would apply the ethics 
rule as the standard of care in a suit by the client against the lawyer where the pre- 
sumption standard is utilized than in one where evidence standard is applied 
because as a presumption, violation of the rule would lay down the standard of care, 
whereas mere evidence would point in the direction of the standard. 
151. See Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash 1992); see also the following: 
Arkansas-Orsini v. Lany Moyer Trucking. Inc.. 833 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1992), reh'g 
denied, 839 S.W.2d 180 (Ark. 1992); Alabama-Terry Cove North. Inc. v. Marr & 
Friedlander, P.c., 521 So. 2d 22 (Ala. 1988); Kentucky-Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 
331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Wisconsin-Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 
N.W.2d 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
152. Mallen .& Smith, supra 2 note, 5 18.7. at 576-585. 
153. See Hizay, 830 P.2d 646. 
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Mallen's objections fall within three groups: (a) those which support 
the disclaimers from the ethics codes-the "legislative intent" argu- 
ment;'" (b) those drawn from the difference in the underlying purpose 
of ethics rules from civil standards-the "different purposes" argument; 
and (c) those based on the procedural and substantive law differences 
between malpractice actions and professional discipline hearings-the 
"substantive legal differences" argument. 
a. The "Legislative Intent " Argument 
This is the line of arguments that the disclaimers should be given 
express effect because "the use of ethical standards in civil litigation was 
not contemplated by the  drafter^."'^^ This argument postulates that the 
disclaimers were designed for the regulation of lawyers, with a disciplin- 
ary remedy in mind; and because the objectives of disci- 
pline-punishment, exemplary (to warn the profession), and prophylac- 
tic-are distinct from the objectives of civil litigation, such standards are 
inappropriate for use in the civil arena. Mallen sums up this objection as 
follows: "[Tlhe drafting of ethical codes did not involve consideration of 
the principles appropriate for deciding civil liability."'s6 
For precisely the reason stated by Professor Hazard, that the stan- 
dards of a vocation are generally held to be evidence of the legal standard 
of care in practicing that vo~ation,'~' this argument simply is not per- 
suasive. It is perfectly appropriate to agree with the propositions stated by 
Mallen; unfortunately, they do not justify his conclusion. The fact that the 
drafters intended the ethics codes to be codes of discipline does not avoid 
or detract from the fact that by creating standards of conduct in the disci- 
plinary context, they were defining standards that could be applied in the 
civil context as well, provided that the codified standards actually articu- 
lated the customary practice in the jurisdiction. By creating minimum 
standards of conduct, the ethics codes inevitably establish one measure 
(and not necessarily the exclusive or sole measure) of the minimum stan- 
dard of care. Again, the speed limit analogy from automobile accident 
cases provides the determinative repudiation of the "legislative intent" 
154. See infra notes 163, 164 and accompanying text. 
155. Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, 18.7. 
156. Id. at 580. 
157. See supra note 35. 
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b. The "Different Purposes" Argument 
The second group of objections relates to the source of the regula- 
tions contained in the ethics codes is that since the ethics codes are, in 
almost all jurisdictions, promulgated as court rules rather than as legisla- 
tion, and their purpose is regulatory, they cannot form the basis' for the 
assertion of civil liability. 
A less obvious issue is whether the ethical rules are statutory, which 
in turn raises the question what is a statute? It is clear that laws promul- 
gated by Congress and other constitutionally established legislatures are 
statutory in nature.Is9 A substantial body of case law recognizes munic- 
ipal ordinan~es, '~~ administrative regulations,16' executive orders,16' 
and treaties1" as having the same properties as purely legislative enact- 
ments, although some courts treat some of these provisions less deferen- 
ti all^.'^ 
158. A criminal or safety statute may not have been intended by the legislature to 
create a civil standard, but where the court concludes that the statute was intended 
to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of 
harm the statute was intended to protect against, the statute is an appropriate one for 
application in the civil setting. See supra note 142, infra note 225 and accompanying 
text. 
159. Federal Trust Co. v. East Hartford Fie  Dist., 283 F.95. 98 (Conn 1899); In 
re Van Tassell's Will, 119 Misc. 478, 196, 194 N.Y.S. 491, 494 (1922); Washington 
v. Dowling. 109 So. 588, 591 (Fla. 1926). 
160. District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159 @.C. 1982); Ray v. Goldsmith. 
400 N.E.2d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Crago v. Lurie, 273 S.E.2d 344 (W. Va. 
1980). 
161. Davis v. Marathon Oil, 356 N.E.2d 93 (Ill. 1976) (from Prosser supra note 1 
at 220). 
162. Board of Educ. of Erie County v. Rhodes, 477 N.E.2d 1171, 1175 
(Governor's order had effect of a legislative enactment); 13 M.J. 501, 529 (proce- 
dures by which court-martial imposes death sentence are prescribed in part by execu- 
tive order which has the force and effect of law). 
163. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (treaties containing stipula- 
tions that are self-executing have the force of a legislative enactment); Stoffel v. 
W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining & .Molasses Co., 35 F.2d 602, 603 (E.D. Penn. 1929) 
(law of the United States is found in the Constitution, acts of Congress and treaties 
as interpreted by courts). 
164. Prosser supra note 1, at 220. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 
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The question of whether administrative orders of the courts, in con- 
trast to judicial decisions, should be treated as statutory for purposes of 
tort law, is an open one. For example, courts, exercising their inherent 
powerslS promulgate a number of different sets of rules for the purpose 
of administering the judicial system.166 
The codes of ethics, as discussed in this Article, have been estab- 
lished by the courts to govern the conduct of attorneys, not only in the 
courtroom, but also in their non-litigation legal work and personal 
lives.167 As a licensing mechanism, related to attorney discipline, rules 
governing the admission of lawyers to practice in a jurisdiction or before 
a particular court have been adopted by the courts in every jurisdic- 
tion.'" Courts have also created regulations governing the conduct of 
the judiciary through codes of judicial conduct.'69 Finally, rules of civil 
and criminal procedure in most jurisdictions are court-made. Thus, the 
rulemaking authority of the courts has a firm foundation in our constitu- 
tional system. 
The party asserting the statutory violation by another party must 
show: 1) that he is among the class of persons that the statute was intend- 
ed to protect, and 2) that his injury was within the scope of the harm the 
statute was intended to protect against.170 Most of the reported cases ad- 
dress this aspect of the doctrine.171 
The more complex and perplexing question is whether the ethical 
rules are statutes. A statute may be defined as a rule promulgated by a 
legislative body and implemented by the executive authority of the state. 
Regulations are similar to statutes, except that they do not carry the force 
394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding that an Alabama ordinance prohibiting public demon- 
strations without a permit was too broad, as it was written, and was unconstitution- 
al); Distad v. Cubin. 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981) (holding that the regulation was 
"overbroad and inflexible"). 
165. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
166. For an interesting discussion of the origin of the inherent powers dochine 
and its current status, see WOLFRAM supra note 21. 
167. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. GWL, 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); In re 
Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1976); Application of Taylor, 647 P.2d 462 (Or. 
1982); but see Matter of Anonymous, 549 N.E.2d 472 (N.Y. 1989). 
168. WOLFRAM, supra note 21. 
169. See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). 
170. Prosser. supra note 1, $ 36 at 229-230. 
171. Osbome v. McMasters. 41 N.W. 543, (Minn 1889); Stachniewcz v. Mar-Cam 
Corp., 488 P.2d 436 (Or. 1971). See also Thomas v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 310 
A.2d 186 (Md. 1973). Goms v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874). 
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of law, although an officer or agency may be empowered by the authority 
of a statute to enforce regulations. Laws, by their very nature, create 
duties and establish standards of conduct. Some statutes incorporate a 
sanction, either civil or criminal, to be imposed upon their violation. 
Where the statute does not specify a particular civil penalty, the question 
often arises whether the standard of conduct defined in the statute should 
be applied as the standard of care in a civil action. The widely accepted 
test for applying statutory standards to civil actions is whether the legisla- 
ture intended to protect the class of persons of whom the plaintiff is a 
member from the type of harm that occurred.172 If this two-pronged test 
is met, the statute may be introduced as evidence of negligence in a civil 
action. 
Administrative regulations and municipal ordinances carry less 
weight than pure legislative enactments, but they are generally admissible 
as evidence of negligence if they meet the same test required for 
statutes.'73 Municipal ordinances also have been held to be relevant to 
civil liability only when the governing body acts in its legislative as 
opposed to proprietary ~apacity."~ 
All of these rules have certain common elements: They create new 
or codify existing standards of conduct; they are promulgated and en- 
forced by civil authority; they represent an action of the state; they are 
subject to procedural and constitutional review. In one sense, the question 
of whether the rule is a legislative statute begs the question. 
Is it the quality of the statute itself that makes it subject to adoption 
as a standard for civil liability, or is it a question of convenience for the 
courts? The answer is that it is both. The court looks for standards of 
conduct within enactments, but it is the court's authority that permits it to 
utilize the statute in a different context. Judicially created rules can serve 
the same purposes as other statutory enactments, and are therefore ap- 
propriate for adoption as civil standards. The court, in the final analysis, 
as a matter of convenience, must decide whether particular provisions are 
appropriate civil standards. 
The inherent powers doctrine recognizes that the principle of judicial 
authority implies a power to establish rules necessary to carry out the 
constitutional mandate of administering j~stice."~ Arguably, ceding the 
172. Prosser, supra note 1 ,  at 220. 
173. Prosser, supra note 1, 8 36, at 220. 
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
175. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 923, 936 (6th Cir. 1980); Pichon v. Ben- 
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power to establish ancillary procedural rules to the legislative or execu- 
tive branch would both fatally undermine judicial power and destroy the 
separation of powers among the branches of g0~ernment.I~~ 
A further examination of the state action analysis applied by the 
Supreme Court to municipal ordinances may shed light on how to ana- 
lyze judicially created rules such as a code of legal ethics. In Lafay- 
ette17' and B o ~ l d e r , ' ~ ~  the Supreme Court recognized that municipali- 
ties could engage in state action for purposes of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act if their actions involved governmental as opposed to corporate or 
proprietary f~nctions. '~~ The Court recognized that local governments 
possessed a dual nature, to act in a legislative capacity and to do what 
could otherwise be done by private enterpri~e.'~" Thus, if a city holds a 
Fourth of July celebration, with fireworks and hot dogs, it is engaging in 
a corporate function, but if it passes a law limiting the speed limit to 25 
miles per hour within the city limits, it acts in its legislative capacity. The 
former but not the latter activity would be subject to the Sherman Act. 
Arguably, the latter but not the former action, creates a standard of con- 
duct that could be introduced as evidence of negligence. 
Judicial rules, supported by the inherent powers doctrine, are differ- 
ent from both ordinances/regulations and legislative enactments. They are 
not, strictly speaking, statutes, but they normally carry the force of state 
action through the power of the courts. Since judicial rules are not truly 
legislative, it is arguable that some court actions are not state actions, and 
should not be looked to as standards for civil conduct. 
Ethical codes are promulgated by state courts, although typically 
drafted by lawyers and based upon the Model Code or Rules adopted by 
the American Bar Association. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,''' the 
jamin. 702 P.2d 890, 892 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); Parker v. Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft, 781 P.2d 1099; 1101 (Kan. 1989); In  re Daly, 189 N.W.2d 176, 
179 n.5 (Minn. 1971); I n  Re Conduct of Tonkon, 642 P.2d 660. 661-62 (Or. 1982); 
In  re Axelrod, 549 A.2d 653, (Vt. 1988). 
176. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding 
that the executive branch cannot make laws and Congress cannot delegate such pow- 
er); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 21 1 (1995) (holding that Congress 
cannot make laws that interfere with the judgments of the federal courts). 
177. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
178. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
179. Lafayette. 435 U.S. at 413-415; Boulder, 455 U.S. at 48-51. 
180. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 40-41 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 
(1943)). 
181. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
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Supreme Court held a minimum fee schedule violated the Sherman Act 
because the state bar association that adopted the schedule was not acting 
as the sovereign, and therefore was not exempt from the Sherman act 
under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown.''' The Virginia Bar would have 
disciplined a lawyer under the state's code of professional responsibility 
for not charging the fee prescribed in the minimum fee schedule. In Bates 
v. State Bar of ~ r i z o n a , ' ~ ~  the Court held that regulation of lawyer ad- 
vertising was state action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown, but 
that the state was constitutionally limited by the commercial speech doc- 
trine in the way it could exercise its authority.'" These cases, while not 
dispositive of the question of whether violation of an ethical rule is rele- 
vant to the standard of care in a professional negligence case, do illustrate 
the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized that ethical rules, pro- 
mulgated by the highest court in a jurisdiction, can represent state action. 
It follows that rules created and enforced through such state action 
are sufficiently like legislative enactments, ordinances and administrative 
regulations to be treated in the same way for purposes of the civil law. If 
the ethical rule was intended by the court to create a standard of conduct 
which protects a particular class of persons from a particular type of 
harm, then the standard should be relevant to the standard of care expect- 
ed of lawyers regulated by the rule. 
Following this line of reasoning, Mallen's different purposes objec- 
tion cannot withstand scrutiny. If the ethics codes have the characteristics 
of statutes insofar as they purport to define standards of conduct for law- 
yers, there is absolutely no reason why a court as a matter of convenience 
may not adopt the codified standard as a calculus for defining the stan- 
dard of care in a legal malpractice action. The breach of an externally 
defined minimum standard of conduct is simply used to establish a com- 
ponent of liability, not to create any new remedy for a wrong which 
would have otherwise gone unremedied. Thus, this objection, based as it 
is on a false assumption, is simply wrong. 
182. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
183. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
184. Id. at 359. 
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c. The "Substantive Legal Diflerences" Argument 
This third objection is based on the procedural and substantive law 
differences between malpractice actions and professional discipline hear- 
ings. In propounding this line of reasoning, Mallen correctly states that a 
lawyer can be disciplined even if the misconduct causes no damage.lS 
He notes that even where the complainant alleges harm, that complainant 
is not a party to disciplinary proceedings.la6 He notes further that a vio- 
lation of a discipline standard "may not be negligen~e."'~' As to each of 
these "objections" we can agree with the propositions without accepting 
at all that they lead to the conclusion suggested by Mallen. There are, in 
fact two different systems, but the fact that a standard has been created in 
one of those systems does not really say whether the standard ought to be 
used in the other system. The issue of whether a standard is appropriate 
for the other system depends upon whether it meets the test for establish- 
ing a standard of care in that system. 
Mallen states that "whereas, the [ethics codes] set a minimum level 
of conduct with the consequence of disciplinary action, malpractice liabil- 
ity is premised upon the conduct of the 'reasonable' lawyer."18' In fact, 
the Model Rules refer repeatedly to the reasonableness of conduct in 
defining their standards. The "Terminology" section of the Model Rules 
states that "'Reasonable' or 'reasonably' when used in relation to conduct 
by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent 
lawyer."'89 Clearly, the objective standards in the Model Rules and the 
civil standard of care are identical. Mallen's attempted distinction, it 
seems, is misplaced, inasmuch as the minimum level of conduct is that of 
the reasonable lawyer. 
We can turn, therefore, to look at the ~ i z e y ' ~  decision. In a mal- 
185. Mallen & Smith. supra note 2. at 581. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. (emphasis added). 
189. MODEL RULES, Terminology. The Model Code is not as precise in its syntzx. 
which raises questions about how easily its standards translate into civil standards. 
Since the vast majority of jurisdictions have adopted a version of the Model Rules, 
this is less of a problem than it may seem. Even in the absence of clear language 
establishing an objective standard that tracks the civil definition. the Model Code 
still articulates a number of clear duties of lawyers towards their clients. 
190. Hizey, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992). 
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practice case alleging that the attorney had failed to disclose or obtain the 
necessary consents with respect to conflicts of interest arising from his 
representation of multiple clients in the same real estate transaction, the 
trial court excluded expert testimony and jury instructions proffered by 
the plaintiff to show the defendant's breaches of the provisions of the ap- 
plicable ethics codes in Washington State. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Washington expressly held that "an expert witness may neither explic- 
itly refer to the [ethics codes] nor may their existence be revealed to the 
jury via  instruction^."'^^ The court's reasoning process in reaching this 
decision is instructive. 
The first reason advanced is based on the disclaimers contained in 
the ethics codes, discussed at Section IV above. In this context, the court 
derives its authority from earlier cases whose actual holdings state only 
that a violation of an ethics code does not "in itself, generate a separate 
cause of action."'92 As already dem~nstrated,'~~ this quoted statement 
is at the same time both accurate and irrelevant; the proposition being 
advanced is not that a separate ground of civil liability is based upon a 
breach of the ethics code. The court is setting up, in order to demolish, 
the proposition that the ethics codes can be used to establish per se civil 
liability. As already explained, this is a paper tiger.'94 An element of the 
civil tort known as malpractice is the duty, based upon a standard of care, 
191. Id at 648. 
192. Id at 651 (citing Brown v. Samalin & Bock, P.C., 408, 547 N.Y.S.2d 80 
(1989)). 
193. See supra part II. 
194. See supra part III. The Hizey court has been criticized elsewhere for its over 
reliance on the Preliminary Statement of the Model Code. 
The Hizey court misread the language of the Preliminary Statement as 
precluding the admissibility of professional ethical standards as relevant 
evidence of an attorney's common law duty of care. The language of 
the Preliminary Statement does not compel this result. The Preliminary 
Statement asserts that the [Code] does not 'undertake to define standards 
for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.' The word 
'undertake' connotes more than the meaning of 'attempt' or 'engage in.' 
It implies a greater burden amounting to a guarantee or an obligation. In 
the Preliminary Statement, the drafters of the [Code] merely refused to 
guarantee that the [Code] would define conclusively any standards of 
civil liability. 
Marc. R. Greenough, The Inadmissibility of Professional Ethical Standards in Legal 
Malpmctice Actions Afer Hizey v. Carpenter, 68 WASH. L. REV. 395. 405 (1993). 
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which may properly be proved by reference to the ethics codes. The court 
has thus swallowed the same red hemng proffered by Mallen,'" whom, 
indeed, the court goes on to' cite with approval.'% 
The court next acknowledges that other authorities, and other courts, 
have held that the ethics codes provide "evidence" of the applicable stan- 
dard of care. The court notes that it disagrees, both for the reasons d- 
ready discussed and for additional "significant policy reasons."'97 Before 
exploring these, the court echoes the definition of the tort of malpractice. 
Although not clearly expressing the standard of care as an element in its 
own definition, it does state the following: 'To comply with the duty of 
care, an attorney must exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence, and 
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, 
and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this juri~diction."'~~ This is 
an entirely appropriate statement of the standard of care. 
Instead of building on this proper foundation, however, the court 
again strays into muddy waters. It proceeds to review the arguments in 
Mallen's third procedural group of objections reviewed above, and then 
argues that because the ethics codes are intended as disciplinary, or ad- 
ministrative regulations, they cannot amount to evidence of negligence. 
Again, this reasoning is flawed. The disciplinary (and other) purposes of 
the ethics code cannot hide the unassailable fact that, in reaching those 
purposes, the ethics codes establish minimum standards of conduct for 
those same "reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer[s] in the practice of 
law in this j~risdiction."'~~ 
The fallacy within the court's reasoning in this regard can be seen 
from its misunderstanding of a passage quoted from a Tennessee case: 
"[Iln a civil action charging malpractice, the standard of care is the par- 
ticular duty owed the client under the circumstances of the representation, 
which may or may not be the standard contemplated by the Code."zoo 
195. Hizey, 830 P.2d at 653. 
196. Id. at 651. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 652 (citing Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238 (Wash Ct. App. 
1975)). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 652 (citing Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 
S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1991). It is remarkable that the Court should refer to this deci- 
sion, since it falls squarely in the Alternative 2 category, as the following extract 
demonstrates: 
Even though . . . the Code does not define standards for civil liability. 
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Now this may be a perfectly unexceptionable statement. It is true that 
there are some breaches of the standard of care that have no reference to 
the code whatever, except perhaps in the general sense of services that 
were not competent within the meaning of the ethics code. In those in- 
stances the issue will be what is "competence" in the particular practice 
area for a "reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in the practice of law 
in this jurisdiction". In other instances, the ethics code itself may itself 
define the minimum standard of care, as, for instance, in cases involving 
conflicts of interest, where the code provides for disclosure and consent; 
in such a case, the requirement of disclosure and consent constitutes the 
minimum conduct acceptable for every lawyer bound by that code, such 
that no lawyer should be able to argue that he or she was not bound to 
comply with the requirement. In such event, the quoted statement is still 
true, and applies because the two standards coincide. In still other situa- 
tions, particular provisions of the ethics codes may not speak to the stan- 
dard of care at 
The court goes on to state that "[u]nderlying our decision not to ex- 
tend [the ethics codes] into the malpractice arena is the conviction that 
plaintiffs already have available adequate and recognized common law 
theories under which to bring malpractice actions."202 The objection to 
this reasoning is that neither plaintiffs nor these authors are seeking to 
create a "new common law theory" or cause of action. Rather, they are 
seeking to demonstrate the standard of care by reference to one of the 
possible sources of that standard, namely the applicable ethics code. 
Next, the court acknowledges the reference by courts, including the 
courts of Washington State, to the ethics codes in connection with other 
non-disciplinary proceedings, such as issues relating to attorneys' fees. 
This is correct and is another reason why the procedural objections ad- 
vanced by Mallen and the Hizey court are of dubious merit. The court 
even acknowledges precedent in Washington in which courts have "as- 
the standards stated in the Code are not irrelevant in determining the 
standard of care in certain actions for malpractice. The Code may pro- 
vide guidance in ascertaining lawyers' obligations to their clients under 
various circumstances, and conduct which violates the code may also 
constitute a breach of the standard of care due a client. 
Lazy Seven Coal Sales, 813 S.W.2d at 405 (emphasis added). 
201. See supra notes 19 and 25 and accompanying text. 
202. Id. at 653 (citations ommitted). 
Heinonline - -  22 J. Legal Prof. 75 1998 
76 The Journal of the Legal Profession [Vol. 22:33 
sumed, without squarely addressing,"203 the relevance of the ethics code 
in malpractice cases. Indeed, and in the light of these precedents, the 
court then makes the following statement, which, standing alone, is en- 
tirely acceptable: 
To avoid confusion in practice, we point out experts on an attorney's 
duty of care may still properly base their opinion, as Professor 
Boemer did in this case, on an attorney's failure to conform to an 
ethics rule. In so testifying, however, the expert must address the 
breach of the legal duty of care and not simply the supposed breach 
of the ethics rules.= (emphasis added). 
Had the court left the matter there, its decision would be unremark- 
able; unfortunately it did not. Instead it continued: 
Such testimony may not be presented in such a way that the jury 
could conclude it was the ethical violations that were actionable, 
rather than the breach of the legal duty of care. In practice, this can 
be achieved by allowing the expert to use language from the [ethical 
codes], but prohibiting explicit reference to them. The expert must 
testify generally as to ethical requirements, concluding the attorney's 
violations of the ethical rules constituted a deviation from the legal 
standard of care. Without this evidentiary link, the plaintiff risks 
dismissal of the malpractice case for failure properly to establish the 
breach of the duty of care. Ambrosio & McLaughlin, at 1363.m 
Following this passage, the court goes on to rule that jury instructions 
may not refer to the ethical codes, and that the jury may not be informed 
of the ethical codes "either directly or through jury instructions or 
through the testimony of an expert who refers to [them]."206 
The fundamental illogic of the court's position is apparent from 
analysis of these quotations. On the one hand, the court starts out from 
the (correct) proposition that "experts on an attorney's duty of care may 
still properly base their opinion, as Professor Boerner did in this case, on 
an attorney's failure to conform to an ethics rule."m Yet the court ends 
by excluding from jury consideration in any form precisely the fact of 
that failure. 
203. Id. at 654. 
204. Id. (emphasis added). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. (emphasis added). 
207. Id. 
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The fundamental reason why the latter conclusion and holding are 
wrong derives from the court's failure to perceive, or to address, the 
significance of the ethics codes. Even though we may agree with every 
proposition advanced by the court, and by Mallen, as to the purposes of 
the ethics codes; and even though we may agree with every proposition 
as to the procedural distinctions between professional discipline and civil 
liability, these propositions do no more than avoid the real significance of 
the ethics rules in the context of civil disputes: to create minimum 
standards of attorney conduct. Indeed, some courts have expressly al- 
lowed the use of disciplinary rules as evidence of minimum standards. In 
May01 v. Summers, Watson & Kimpe1,208 the following jury instructions 
were given: 
There was in force in the State of Illinois at the time of the occur- 
rence in question a certain Supreme Court Rule which provided that: 
A lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule; or engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . 
A lawyer shall not: 
(1) handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that 
he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer 
who is competent to handle it; 
(2) handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the 
circumstances; or 
(3) neglect a legal matter entrusted to him 
If you decide that a defendant violated the Supreme Court Rule on 
the occasion in question, then you may consider that fact together 
with all other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining 
whether and to what extent, if any, the defendant was negligent or 
wilful, wanton or reckless at the time of the o c c u r r e n ~ e . ~  
In affming the use of these instructions, the Appellate Court stated: 
Like most statutes and ordinances, attorney disciplinary rules estab- 
lish minimum standards of conduct and are intended to protect the 
general public. For these reasons, we hold that jury instructions may 
quote attorney disciplinary rules in legal malpractice cases to the 
same extent as they may quote statutes and ordinances in instructions 
in other types of negligence 
208. 585 N.E.2d 1176 (1992). 
209. Id. at 1186. 
210. Id. 
Heinonline - -  22 J. Legal Prof. 77 1998 
The Journal of the Legal Profession [Vol. 22:33 
There is another way to look at the holding in Hizey, which further 
points up the problematic logic on which it rests. The court would appar- 
ently pennit the expert to testify on the standard of care by using the 
exact words contained in the ethics code; the preclusion goes to the refer- 
ence to the source of the words. Refemng back to the car accident analo- 
gy, this is exactly akin to a determination that an expert could testify that 
reasonably prudent driving would require a speed of 25 m.p.h. without 
permitting testimony that such was the actual speed limit in effect. 
By definition, an attorney whose conduct has fallen below the mini- 
mum standards set forth in the governing ethics code has failed to behave 
as a "reasonable" attorney in that jurisdiction. No amount of discussion of 
the purposes, or disciplinary procedures associated with ethics codes can 
avoid that fundamental conclusion, and efforts, including the "disclaim- 
ers" inserted into the codes themselves, are, as Hazard has rightly stated, 
"fatuous, if not f~tile."~" It follows, from the statement that violation of 
the ethics codes constitutes a failure to behave in accordance with the 
standards of a "reasonable" attorney, that such failure constitutes a breach 
of the applicable standard of care. It follows, necessarily and ineluctably, 
that the plaintiff is entitled to present, and the jury to hear, proof of the 
two elements of the tort, namely the standard of care and its breach 
through proof that the defendant lawyer has violated an ethical rule. In- 
deed it is notable that in the cited passage the court comes very close to 
admitting this even as it is about to rule to the opposite effect. 
At least twenty-two states appear not to have yet taken a formal 
position on this While there are obviously malpractice cases 
in all of these jurisdictions, the closest that the courts in many of them 
appear to have come is expressly to permit the use of expert testimony; 
in none, however, did the authors find cases specifying to what exactly 
the experts were permitted to testify. This dearth of reported cases indi- 
cates that since the issue has not been clearly resolved in so many states, 
21 1. See supra note 35. 
212. As when it states that "[tlhe expert must testify generally as to ethical re- 
quirements, concluding the attorney's violations of the ethical rules constituted a 
deviation from the legal standard of care." Hizey, 830 P.2d at 654. 
213. In none of the following states did the authors find pertinent cases that 
would be dispositive to this issue: Alaska. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Maryland. Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey. New 
Mexico, Oklahoma. Rhode Island. South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas. Utah, Vir- 
ginia, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
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the analysis and conclusions in this article are so important at this junc- 
ture. 
D. Which Rules? 
There is one other argument that neither Mallen nor the Hizey court 
address that some standards should not form the basis of liability because 
they are too For example, Canon 9 of the Model Code is enti- 
tled "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance of Professional 
Impr~priety."~'~ The fact that some rules are inappropriate to use as 
standards of care in legal malpractice does not mean that all of them are. 
In fact, the central thesis of this article is that only the rules that are 
intended to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff against 
the type of harm against which the rule was intended to protect are appli- 
cable as standards. The authors agree with Robbins that not all ethical 
rules are appropriate as malpractice standards. But which ones? 
There is an obvious danger in enunciating a rule that any reference 
to the ethical code in a malpractice suit should lead inexorably to liabili- 
ty. Certain standards may be violated, but the violation may lead to no 
damage, an essential element in any negligence action. The Code contains 
the Disciplinary Rules, formal standards by which professional conduct is 
measured, along with Ethical Considerations, which are "aspirational in 
character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the 
profession should The Model Rules set forth standards in 
terms of "may" or "shall" or "shall not." Thus, under either the Model 
Code or the Rules, some provisions are merely precatory or provided as a 
guide, while others clearly either mandate or prohibit specific conduct. 
The existence of general provisions that do not themselves speak to a 
standard of care in no way militates against the use of other specific 
provisions in establishing the appropriate standard. 
For purposes of this discussion, it may make more sense to look at 
particular rules than the Rules as a whole, because it is specific rules 
which incorporate standards of conduct. Assuming that judicial rules are 
more like ordinances than true statutes, it is not enough to say that they 
were enacted; it is necessary to say, rather, that the rule in question repre- 
214. See supra note 172. 
215. MODEL CODE, Canon 9. 
216. MODEL CODE. Preliminary Statement. 
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sents the action of the state in defining a standard of conduct, and that 
the rule protects the plaintiff from an identifiable harm.2" 
Where the conduct involved represents the adoption of existing 
standards of behavior such as common law rules, customary practices in 
the profession or conduct supported by other legislative or constitutional 
doctrine, there is a rational basis for saying that the court has defined a 
standard of conduct. Where the standard of conduct represents new du- 
ties, such as the duty to provide pro bono legal assistance,218 it is more 
difficult to establish a nexus between the rule and a standard of conduct, 
and in the absence of clear evidence of the court's intention to create a 
civil standard of care, such rules should not be introduced in civil actions 
for that purpose. Where the judicial pronouncement represents a general, 
non-directive statement, such as the Preamble disclaimer to create civil 
liability, it should not be relevant to the standard of care. Where the rule 
is purely economic in nature, such that it promotes the interests of law- 
yers rather than defines standards for their conduct, it should not be rel- 
evant to the standard of care. 
Applying these principles to the Model Rules, it is possible to define 
a number of specific rules that were intended to create standards of con- 
duct protecting a class of persons from a certain type of harm. Generally, 
those rules defining the responsibilities of lawyers to their clients may be 
said to fall within this definition. The rules which protect the courts, 
judges, the general public, the profession, and opposing counsel do not. 
Rules which define standards of conduct toward non-client third parties 
would arguably apply, but application of these rules would in some cases 
extend the scope of liability beyond what has been traditionally recog- 
nized in legal malpractice law.*19 
The following rules fall clearly within the definition articulated 
above: competence (1. l), informed consent (1.2,1.4), neglect (1.3), rea- 
sonable fees (IS), confidences (1.6), conflicts of interest (1.7- l. l l), and 
protecting the rights of the client upon withdrawal (1.16~).~' It should 
always be relevant in a civil action for malpractice that a lawyer has 
violated one of these rules that protect clients from identifiable wrongs by 
the lawyer. These standards are clearly recognized standards of conduct. 
They protect clients as a class and they identify the particular harm pro- 
217. See supra notes 144, 166 and accompanying text. 
218. MODEL RULES, Rule 6.1 
219. See supra Notes 110, 1 1 1  and accompanying text. 
220. MODEL RULES, Rules 1 .l-1.11, 1.1qc). 
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tected. A violation of any of these rules may be viewed as at least some 
evidence of violation of the standard of professional care. This approach 
explains some of the conflicting case law on the subject. Although some 
courts summarily exclude rule violations as evidence of negligence, an 
examination of the cases shows that often the issues presented involve 
rules that are not really appropriate for establishing a standard because 
they do not meet the threshold test of applicability. 
The framers of the Model Rules grouped all the rules defining 
lawyers' duties to clients in one subdivision, Rule The dlassifica- 
tion scheme in the Model Rules actually helps to clarify the scope of 
protections defined therein. The historical record and background materi- 
als also provide support for determinations of when the rules codify cus- 
tomary practice and duties of lawyers, especially toward their clients. 
These provisions are relevant to the standard of conduct to which lawyers 
should be held, and their violation should be admissible as evidence of 
the breach of the standard of care. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to demonstrate the relevance of ethical 
rules to the standard of care in legal malpractice. The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which are in effect in approximately forty jurisdic- 
tions, provide a clear statement of many of the duties inherent in the 
lawyer-client relationship. The breach of such a duty is actionable as 
legal malpractice, and the standard articulated in certain rules should be 
admissible as evidence in such an action. 
There are several reasons that the Rules are valid indicia of the 
standard of care. Foremost among these is the fact that ethical codes, 
from the early Canons of Ethics to the modem Model Rules, essentially 
codify the customary practice upon which the professional standard of 
care is based. The ethical codes are amended periodically, and the codes 
themselves have been replaced as professional standards have evolved. To 
the extent that an ethical rule is the codification of a standard of conduct, 
its violation or adherence raises at least an inference of professional neg- 
ligence. Additionally, the current Model Rules were carefully drafted to 
conform to the substantive law governing lawyers, and many of the argu- 
221. MODEL RULES, Rule 1 The Lawyer-Client Relationship. 
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ments that were levied against the Canons and the Model Code, to the 
effect that they did not reflect the substantive law, are not persuasive. 
A second factor supporting the use of ethical codes in legal malprac- 
tice is the attempt by the drafters of the Model Rules, as reflected in the 
history of the rules themselves, to produce a document whose principles 
were based upon and consistent with the substantive law. From the care- 
ful application of agency principles, to the strained attempt to reduce 
shifting constitutional rules governing commercial speech, to the mundane 
application of the court-made substantial relationship test in conflicts of 
interest, the framers of the Model Rules sought to produce a document 
that would not require one behavior in the disciplinary setting and anoth- 
er in the courtroom. 
The third consideration is the statutory nature of the Rules of Profes- 
sional Conduct. This article concludes that the Rules are statutory in 
nature, because in promulgating the ethics codes, the court is acting in a 
sovereign and rulemaking capacity. The question of whether they are 
legislative is a different one going to the issue of how much weight 
should be accorded to evidence of violation of a rule. For any statutory 
provision to be admissible as evidence of the standard of care, it must be 
shown to protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member 
against the type of harm against which the plaintiff is protected. 
Cast in this light, it is not the Rules themselves that are relevant, but 
specific rules that meet the test of class and harm. Applying the test, 
many of the standards in Rule 1 (the Lawyer-Client Relationship) are 
clearly aimed at protecting a class of persons (clients) from specific evils 
such as those articulated in the substantive rules. Other sections of the 
Model Rules lack the obvious nexus of Rule 1, but client-plaintiffs should 
be allowed to attempt to meet the applicability test in any event. More 
problematic are rules protecting the interests of non-clients, because the 
civil law is more reluctant to provide a remedy to persons not in privity 
with the lawyer. As the privity requirement erodes, the relevance of the 
ethics rules in protecting third parties will become more significant. Inap- 
plicable to the standard of care under this formulation would be rules 
enacted to protect the courts, the public in general, or the administration 
of justice. 
As to the weight that courts should attach to ethical violations, this 
article takes the position that violations should raise an inference of negli- 
gence, rather than a presumption of negligence or negligence per se. Al- 
though there is some merit in arguing that courts, in promulgating ethical 
rules, are acting in a legislative capacity, a better approach is to recognize 
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ethical codes as court rules established under the courts' inherent power 
to regulate the judicial administration process. As such, ethical rules are 
statutory but not necessarily legislative. Courts frequently adopt adminis- 
trative regulations as standards, with often lesser weight than true statutes, 
and it follows that violations of codes of legal ethics should be accorded 
similar weight. 
A final problem for many courts in applying ethical rules in legal 
malpractice is the admonition in the Preamble of the Model Code and 
Rules that the rules should not be used as a basis of civil liability. A 
number of courts have quoted this language in decisions refusing to apply 
ethical rules in civil actions. This superficial approach loses force when it 
is examined more carefully. The Preamble language has been criticized as 
self-serving economic protectionism, drafted by the organized bar and 
ratified by the courts. In fact, an examination of the case law outside the 
field of legal malpractice demonstrates that courts consistently cite ethical 
rules to support decisions that modify the standards of civil liability. 
The only cases where the Preamble disclaimer is applied negatively 
involve the professional liability of lawyers. Significantly, the Preamble, 
like the commentary in the Model Rules, is not included within the body 
of rules that give rise to standards of conduct. It is stated in precatory 
language, which leaves to the tribunal the decision whether or not to 
adopt the ethical standard in a specific case. Given the suspect history of 
the Preamble, the rational nexus between specific rules and customary 
practice or substantive law, and the willingness of courts to strike down 
or ignore ethical rules when it suits them, the admonition not to apply 
ethical rules in civil settings carries very little persuasive force. 
Even following the Preamble's admonition, however, it is argued 
here that courts are not using the rules to create substantive law but to 
apply existing law. Seen in this light, different treatment is appropriate 
for ethical rules that establish new standards of conduct than rules that 
codify customary practice or existing law. Because ethical standards will 
almost always be introduced through expert testimony, the expert is in the 
best position to say whether the ethical rule conforms to customary prac- 
tice. Thus, the plaintiff should be able to introduce an ethical rule as evi- 
dence of the professional standard of care, and violation as its breach, 
where the rule protects the class of persons of which she is a member 
against the harm which befell her. The defendant may rebut such evi- 
dence with competent evidence including the fact that her conduct con- 
formed to the letter of the rule. 
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The application of ethical rules, particularly as articulated in the 
Model Rules, would have the effect of making the plaintiffs case easier 
to prove by establishing a clear, widely accepted standard of conduct. It 
would also make the task of conforming to professional standards easier 
for the practitioner who would have identifiable benchmarks of profes- 
sional care to follow. 
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